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Classical attribution theorists developed models of causal attribution that reflected their belief 
that people were primarily interested in attribution accuracy.  These models did not consider 
contextual factors such as relationships and societal norms which resulted in the emergence of 
several empirical puzzles many of which are related to the use of consensus information.  This 
study investigates whether the puzzle of the differential treatment of consensus information can 
be solved if it is assumed that people are primarily concerned with social features of the 
attribution setting rather than strict attribution accuracy.  This study experimentally tests the role 
of key aspects of the social context such as the impact of social strategies in Kelley’s model of 
attribution to explore whether some of its empirical anomalies could have their origins in the 
social aspects of attribution in research contexts.  The study found that participants were 2.63 
times more likely to provide ‘inaccurate’ responses when there was a risk that the accurate 
answer would be socially disruptive.  Findings from this study suggest that participants prioritise 
the implications of the social context over attribution accuracy.  
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Attribution theory is the body of work that focuses on the process involved when people attempt 
to explain daily events and occurrences.  To elaborate, it examines untrained people’s opinions 
of causality and their actions based on the perceived reason.  The focus is on the process that 
they undergo when answering ‘why’ questions because explaining actions and events is 
fundamental to many forms of human behavior, as the perception of cause or intention forms the 
basis for determining actions or responses.  For example, imagine you see a child crying in a 
mall.  If you believe the child is crying because she is injured, you would attempt to call for or 
provide medical assistance.  However, if you make the attribution that the child is crying because 
she is spoilt and is trying to manipulate her parents into buying her a treat then you might do 
your best to ignore her behaviour. 
 
The need for causal explanations is a daily occurrence and attribution theory explores this type of 
everyday cognition, focusing on the unconscious thought processes that are used to make events 
and actions occurrences understandable, predictable and ultimately controllable.  The theory 
originated in the 1950s in the realm of social psychology.  Attribution theory is the brain-child of 
Heider (1958), but developed and grew in popularity largely due to the work of Jones and Davis 
(1965), as well as that of Kelley (1967).   
 
Decades later, it is still important to analyse the assumptions of these models and theories 
because much of the current work is based on these early foundations.  To illustrate this, a 
citation analysis reveals that Heider (1958) has been cited 4309 times; Kelley (1967) cited 1271 
times (684 in the last decade) and Jones and Davis (1965) have 832 citations (Publish or Perish, 
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2007).   Although one might expect interest in these models to be waning, a more detailed search 
shows that Heider (1958), Kelley (1967) and Jones and Davis (1965) have been cited 2759, 786 
and 526 times respectively in the last ten years, showing strong continued interest in these 
models of attribution.  Although these models are theoretically elegant, they have left us with 
some unsolved empirical mysteries when the models don’t describe what people actually do (cf. 
McArthur, 1972).  This study returns to one of the key empirical puzzles: that of the under use or 
misuse of attribution information.  
The Research Question 
One of the more frequently researched areas in attribution theory is the use of different 
information types in making attributions, which stems from the work of Kelley.  Kelley (1967) 
suggested that people separate information into three types, namely: consensus; distinctiveness 
and consistency.  Kelley’s theory remains a relevant contribution to the field as it demonstrates 
how information is used in an ‘attribution vacuum’; that is, how attributions would be formed 
using only the available information in the absence of other contributing factors.  This ‘ideal 
world’ situation is a solid foundation for attribution research.  However, we do not live in an 
attribution vacuum and consequently there will always be contributing factors such as past 
experiences and social norms.  Kelley’s model does not account for these factors and is therefore 
susceptible to their influence.  
 
 This under-use of consensus information has emerged as an anomaly in several studies that aim 
to test Kelley’s model of attribution (Orvis, Cunningham, and Kelley, 1975 and McArthur, 1976 
in Zuckerman, 1978).  Previous attempts at explaining the difference have identified inadequate 
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research designs as well as the different nature of the information types as possible explanations; 
however, the exact reason for the under-use of consensus information has not yet been identified.  
Thus, the question remains: why is consensus information used in a manner different to that 
predicted by Kelley’s model? 
 
The present study replicates earlier research that empirically tested Kelley’s model (e.g. 
McArthur) but experimentally manipulates the social context of the experimental situation to 
investigate the social dimensions of classical attribution theory.  The study tests whether the 
puzzle of the differential treatment of consensus information can be solved if it is assumed that 
people are primarily concerned with social features of the attribution setting rather than strict 
attribution accuracy.  This study experimentally tests the role of key aspects of the social context 
such as the impact of social strategies in Kelley’s theory to explore whether some of its empirical 







Heider is credited as being the ‘founding father’ of attribution theory.  His book The Psychology 
of Interpersonal Relations (1958) laid the foundation for prospective attribution theorists whose 
work later resulted in attribution research emerging as the dominant theory in social psychology 
during the 1960’s.  Heider described attribution as the process of drawing inferences and he 
focused on how this process occurred when ordinary individuals made inferences based on their 
observations to explain the actions of individuals around them.  Heider described these 
individuals as “naïve psychologists” and he argued that they made these inferences in an attempt 
to predict their environment so that they could gain control of it.  He argued that it is human 
nature to want to have control of the environment around you and, according to Heider, causal 
attribution is the primary process used to achieve this.  He reasoned that the attribution process 
“serves to build up and support the constancy of [their] our picture of the world” (Heider 1958, 
p. 92).   
 
Heider’s basic assumption is that an individual’s behaviour or actions are determined by the 
factors that reside within the individual and in the environment (Heider, 1958).  Therefore Heider 
argued that when the naïve psychologists attempt to determine the explanation for behavioural 
outcomes they would have to use two groups of information.  The first group consists of factors 
that reside within a person (internal factors), and second group is factors that reside within the 
environment (external factors).  He elaborates that the personal factors can be divided into both 
relatively constant sources (power or ability) and more variable and controllable sources 
(motivation and intention).  In the same manner, Heider assumes that the environmental factor is 




Constant Variable Constant Variable 
Power Ability Motivation Intention Difficulty of task Chance 
Figure 1 
Factors that determine behaviour or action (Heider, 1958) 
Based on this, he assumes that behavioural outcomes such as success and failure can be 
attributed to external factors such as ease (success) or the difficulty (failure) of the task and to 
good luck (success) or bad luck (failure) (Heider, 1958).  The combination of the internal and 
external factors forms Heider’s (1958) naïve concept of ‘can’.  If the person’s ability is greater 
than the effective force of the environment then the naïve psychologist can conclude that the task 
can be accomplished.  Heider proposes a multiplicative relationship between motivation and 
power (ability) which implies that the task would not be successful if the person lacks either.  He 
proposes an additive relationship with the environment with the implication that the addition of 
good luck would increase the probability of success while bad luck decreases it.  Heider 
introduced a second concept of ‘trying’ which is the combination of intention and exertion.  With 
this concept, his assumption is that the person should intend to achieve the outcome (i.e. the 
outcome should not be a fluke) and the person should exert some effort towards achieving this 
outcome.  If these requirements are met then the naïve psychologist can conclude that the person 
is trying, or has tried, to achieve the desired outcome.  Heider concluded that ‘can’ and ‘trying’ 




According to Heider (1958, p. 123), “The naïve factor analysis of action permits man to give 
meaning to action, to influence the actions of others as well as of himself, and to predict future 
actions.”   To exemplify this, Heider suggests that if a person knows the behavioural outcome 
and the magnitude of one of the contributing personal causes (e.g. motivation), he can draw 
conclusions with regard to a second personal factor (i.e. effort).   The naïve analysis of action is 
based on the equations of: 
Ability = Performance: Effort 
Effort = Difficulty:  Ability 
The naïve psychologist uses these equations to determine which factors were responsible for an 
action occurring by solving for the missing value based on the available information.  It must be 
remembered that Heider did not consider that this is a conscious process and in most cases the 
naïve psychologist will not be aware of it.  The equations can be used to infer how much effort 
was needed when the person’s ability and the difficulty of the task are known or the person’s 
ability can be inferred when the amount of effort and the performance is known.  For example, 
when soccer sensation Christiano Ronaldo scores a goal most spectators would not infer that it 
was due to chance or ease of the task.  The common inference would be that it was due to his 
ability and that the contribution of environmental factors was minimal.  Thus, it is not 
uncommon to hear the commentators’ remark that ‘he made it look easy’ rather than ‘it was an 
easy chance’.   
 
Heider’s (1958) analysis outlines how ordinary people, acting as naïve psychologists, might  
make inferences using the information that they collect from their observations and how 
predictions for unknown information can be made based on information that is known.  He 
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indicated that the central task for this theory is to differentiate disposition from behaviour.  This 
stemmed from his realisation that within personal interaction individuals make inferences based 
on what a person did or how a person acted as well as knowledge of their abilities and 
dispositions.  These ideas formed the basis for Kelley’s (1967) work on causal schema, which 
will be discussed below. 
 
It should be noted that Heider (1944, 1958) was primarily concerned with phenomenal causality.  
He was specifically concerned with how individuals get the perceptual impression that one event 
causes the other.  His early work focused on persons as the cause and he assumed persons and 
their motives are prone to be perceived as causes of events.  According to Heider, this is because 
personal motives are accepted as a final cause and there is no need for further explanations.  He 
suggests that this has contributed to a tendency to make attributions to personal motives and 
intentions.  Heider warns that the tendency to structure unconnected events in terms of personal 
intentions can lead to an underestimation of situational factors.  This suggests that it is more 
likely that the person would be blamed for an action, for example, the failure to make an ATM 
withdrawal than a fault with the ATM or the banking institute.  
 
Consequently, Heider (1958) was also interested in the conditions underlying attribution of 
“intent” or “motive”.  He introduced the concept of equifinality which means that the behaviour 
of an individual, under different conditions leads to identical effects (1958).  According to 
Heider, if the individual’s behaviour in different situations or in different occasions leads to 
different outcomes their actions cannot be attributed to intent.  He also suggests that causality 
can only be attributed if the individual can achieve the desired outcome.  Heider concluded that 
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information about equifinality and causality is analysed by observers to determine intent (1958).  
His later work was guided by an interest in inferred causality that required the observer to make 
multiple observations of the action, event or person before drawing inferences.  These ideas were 
taken up by Jones and Davis (1965) in the development of their theory of correspondent 
inferences. 
 
Lastly, Heider (1958) was interested in causal inferences based on available information.  He 
formulated his covariation theory to explain the process.This theory was based on Mill’s 
methods of experimental inquiry and included a Gestalt influence.  Heider provides the example 
of attribution of enjoyment to an object to demonstrate the principle: 
“If I always experience enjoyment when I interact with an object, and something other than 
enjoyment when the object is removed (longing, annoyance, or a more neutral reaction, for 
instance) then I will consider the object the cause of the enjoyment. The effect, enjoyment is seen 
to vary in a highly coordinated way with the presence and absence of the object.” (Heider, 1958, 
p. 152) 
 
Heider continued his analysis of observations of the effects with different conditions.  These 
observations concerned: (1) the presence or absence of the effect with the presence or absence of 
the object, (2) the presence or absence of the effect with different states or classes of objects, and 
(3) the presence or absence of the effect with different persons (Heider, 1958).  These ideas were 




Interest in Heider’s (1958) work and attribution theory on a whole was only ignited after the 
advancements to the theory made by Jones and Davies (1965) and Kelley (1967) who extended 
Heider’s notions of attribution of intention and disposition and attribution by naïve analysis of 
covariation respectively.  Although Kelley’s work has been more influential (as assessed by 
citation count, discussed above), both were influential in defining the field of attribution theory 




Jones and Davis Theory of Correspondent Inferences 
Jones and Davis were guided in their chapter From Acts to Dispositions (1965) by Heider’s 
(1958) work, in particular his contention that individuals have an essential desire to predict and 
control their environment and that causal attribution is a primary means of doing so.  The core of 
this piece of work was their theory of correspondent inferences which explored the role or use of 
information on outcomes or effects by individuals when making decisions and the inferences that 
can be made based on these outcomes/effects.  They were of the opinion that actions originated 
from intentions and intentions were derived from stable dispositions.  Jones and Davis (1965) 
concluded that if intentions can be deduced from observed actions, and with dispositions inferred 
from intentions, then people would have sufficient knowledge to understand, predict and control 
the behaviour of others.  They focused on how individuals draw the conclusions that they do, 
which theoretically should be based on the available information. 
 
To elaborate, the process involves the use of both observations and inferences.  In the model, an 
observer views an actor’s action and the outcome/effects of the action.  An observer can infer 
what the intention of the actor was based on the result.  However, Jones and Davis (1965, p. 220) 
stipulate that certain requirements which were identified in Heider’s (1958) work need to be met 
in order to infer underlying intentions from the observed action and its effects.  They are: 
The assumption of knowledge on the part of the actor: The observer must believe that the 
actor was aware that his actions would have the observed effects.   
The assumption of ability: The observer must judge that the actor has the ability to 
achieve the observed outcome. 
18 
 
The contribution of luck or chance: The observer must judge that the effect was not a 
result of luck or chance. 
To illustrate, the theory will be applied to Brad Pitt’s recent well-publicized choice between ‘our 
favourite friend’ (Jennifer Aniston) or ‘the tomb raider’ (Angelina Jolie).   
 
Pitt’s first option was Jennifer Aniston, who is the daughter of actor John Aniston and actress 
Nancy Dow, and who is best known for her role of Rachael Green in the sitcom Friends.  Ms. 
Aniston can be described as the ‘typical girl next door’, which is a huge contrast to the third 
party or ‘the other woman’ since she has been voted the greatest sex symbol of all time (The 100 
Greatest Sex Symbols, 2007) and was described as the world's most beautiful woman (100 Most 
Beautiful edition of People Magazine, 2006).  She is actress; former fashion model; and a 
Goodwill Ambassador for the United Nations Refugee Agency, Ms. Angelina Jolie.  Ms. Jolie, 
who is the daughter of actor Jon Voight and the late actress Marcheline Bertrand, has since 
become one of the most highly paid and sought after actresses in Hollywood after playing the 
role of Lara Croft in Lara Croft: Tomb Raider (2001) and after acting alongside Pitt in Mr. and 
Mrs. Smith (2005).  She has also received international media attention for her humanitarian 
work and for her adoption of orphaned children from Cambodia, Africa, and Vietnam.  Pitt 
became romantically involved with Ms. Jolie while they were filming the movie Mr. and Mrs. 
Smith (2005).  His marriage to Ms. Aniston was deteriorating at that time and the media 
speculated that it was due to Pitt having a desire for children and Ms. Aniston not.  Eventually 
Pitt chose Ms. Jolie. An observer inferring Brad Pitt’s motives for his decision would need to 
consider the following information: his new partner was one of the sexiest women in the world 
(effect 1); she was wealthy, with a net worth estimated at USD35 million 
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(www.kineda.com/fabulously-rich-and-famous-angelina-jolie) which resulted in an overall 
increase in their joint monetary wealth (effect 2); they became one of the most popular couples in 
the world raising their social position (effect 3); he was able to fulfill his paternal desires (effect 
4).  However, his previous partner is also considered one of the sexiest women in the world 
(effect one); she is even more wealthy, with an estimated net worth of USD110 million in 2007 
(www.forbes.com/2007/01/17/richest-women-entertainment-tech-mediaczlgrichwomen070118 
womenstarslander.html) (effect 2); and they were also very popular as a couple (effect 3).  Since 
three of these effects are common to each choice, the theory of correspondent inferences would 
argue that the fourth effect (wanting children) is the best indication of Pitt’s intentions. 
 
According to Jones and Davis (1965), before inferences can be made about the actor’s intentions 
the assumptions (discussed above) must be met.  The observer can assume that Pitt was aware 
that Jolie had adopted children and they may have discussed a common desire to have biological 
children or adopt further, thus the actor had knowledge.  Secondly, the observer must assume 
that Pitt had the ability to make this decision, and that it was not forced on him.  Lastly the 
observer must judge that Pitt becoming a father was expected and not a result of luck or chance.   
After the assumptions are met, the observers are in a better position to make the inference that 




The second aspect of the theory is the concept of correspondence.  Jones and Davis (1965, p. 
224) define correspondence as “Given an attribute-effect linkage1 which is offered to explain 
why an act occurred, correspondence increases as the judged value of the attribute departs from 
the judge’s conception of the average person’s standing on that attribute”.  Simplified, 
correspondence is the quantity of information that the perceiver collects on the dispositions and 
intentions of the actor from observing an action and the outcome/effect.  High correspondence 
correlates with the extent of the perceiver’s belief that the action was based on the actor’s 
disposition.  In the example, correspondence would be high if the public (perceiver) believes that 
Pitt (actor) chose Ms. Jolie (action) so that he would be able to fulfill his paternal desires 
(disposition).  Correspondence would be low if the public was unable to determine why Pitt 
chose Ms. Jolie. 
 
According to Jones and Davies (1965), in a relevant situation, the observer is aware of the 
alternative actions that the actor can take.  The theory further assumes that the observer compares 
the effects/outcomes of the alternative actions and identifies common and non-common effects.  
As the names indicate, a common effect would be the result of either action, while a non-
common effect is only achieved by one of the actions.  The observer is expected to use the non-
common effects to make inferences about intentions and dispositions.  Jones and Davis (1965), 
suggest that correspondence decreases when non-common effects increase.  They add that the 
desirability of a non-common effect will determine the degree to which the disposition 
corresponds with an action.  
                                               
1 An attribute-effect linkage is the “perception of a link between a particular intention or disposition and a particular 
action” (Jones and Davis, 1965, p. 224) 
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Effects of choice of partner to be considered:  
 
a. wealth 
b. social position 
c. stability 












B. Elimination of Common Effects 
 




C.         Regrouped Non-common Effects 
 
If choice is: 
        Aniston    c and d wanted, e is not important 
        Jolie          e wanted, c and d not important 
 
D.         Inferences 
            
             If Aniston is selected, Pitt is the domesticated and committed type. 
 If Jolie is selected, Pitt is the paternal type. 
 
Figure 2 
 Pitt chooses a partner (adapted from Jones and Davis, 1965, p231, fig. 4) 
 
e  
   
c d 
  a b e 
  




The figure above is an adaptation from Jones and Davis (1965) to illustrate the desirability of a 
non-common effect concept.  In our example, the public was aware that the women had 
commonalities (both were brown haired Caucasian actresses; daughters of actors; both were 
successful and wealthy) and differences (Ms. Aniston was the typical ‘girl next door’ while Ms. 
Jolie was a ‘maverick sex symbol’).  The observer could ignore the commonalities and focus on 
the differences when attempting to determine which effects Pitt wished to obtain. 
 
The combined effects of both choices of partner are stated for Pitt.  Figure 2 A separates the 
woman to show which effects (effects are represented by letters in a circle that correspond to the 
initial list) are expected from each partner.  The common effects are identified and eliminated.  
In our example, both partners would provide Pitt with additional wealth and social position. 
Thus, according to Jones and Davis (1965), these factors would not influence his decision.  An 
examination of the non-common effects suggest that Pitt would choose Ms. Aniston if he wanted 
stability and marriage from his partner and if children  were less important, however, he would 
choose Ms. Jolie if he wanted children and if stability and marriage were less important.  
Inferences can be drawn based on this.  The public may then infer that if Pitt chose Ms. Aniston 
he would be the domesticated and committed type, however, if Ms. Jolie was chosen he would 
be the paternal type. 
 
Jones and Davis (1965) add that the desirability of the non-common effect plays a role in 
determining the correspondence of intentions and actions.  They indicate that if the non-common 
effect is not universally desirable, the observer can be more confident in making inferences.  The 
non-common effects in the example are universally desirable, however, observers would still be 
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confident with regards to their inferences about Pitt when they consider that a year after choosing 
Ms. Jolie, he is still unmarried but has become the father of Maddox; Zahara; Shiloh; and Pax 
Thien.  
 
According to Jones and Davis (1965), prior knowledge is another factor that has to be 
considered.  They explain that: 
“A person who confronts certain behavior choices has often made previous choices which 
have brought him to his present decision. There is often a great deal of information 
contained, then, in knowledge about what alternatives are being considered, above and 
beyond the information revealed by the actual decision which is made” (1965, p. 233).  
 
Simplified, the observer needs to be informed of prior decisions that have been made.  In terms 
of the example, the public is not aware of the decisions that Pitt made to narrow his choice of 
partner.  Perhaps for unknown reasons he decided that his partner should be a brown haired 
Caucasian actress, whose father is an actor, and she must be successful and wealthy.  Jones and 
Davis (1965) state this to highlight the point that individuals may only use the information 
gained from observations to define correspondence and not information gained from prior 
knowledge.  Prior knowledge brings in additional variables (knowledge) that cannot be 
controlled for and these variables could contribute to an incorrect attribution. 
 
The last factor for determining correspondence is role behaviour.  Jones and Davis (1965, p. 234) 
predict that inferences based on out-of-role behaviour will have a higher correspondence than 
those made from in-role behaviour.  They explain that in-role behaviour is unexceptional to the 
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extent that most individuals want to conform to social norms and expectations (1965, p. 236).  
Thus in-role behaviour is viewed as the actor conforming to the norm and does not provide any 
information about the actors’ intentions or dispositions.  In contrast, out-of-role behaviour is 
deemed to provide relevant information since the behaviour is thought to be a truer reflection of 
the actor’s disposition.  
Kelley’s Covariation Principle 
Kelley advanced Heider’s (1958) ideas on the determinants of causal attributions in his 
influential paper Attribution Theory in Social Psychology (1967).  His theories and work became 
the core principal on which a large number of the later attribution studies were based which 
made him successful in achieving his aim of advancing “the development of attribution theory as 
an explicit, hypothesis-generating, and research-provoking set of principles” (Kelley, 1967, p. 
192).   
 
Kelley defined attribution as “the process of inferring or perceiving the dispositional properties 
of entities in the environment” (1967, p. 193).  Guided by Heider’s (1958) use of J.S. Mill’s 
“Method of Difference”, Kelley developed his covariation principle.  The principle is based on 
the reasoning that when a perceiver has several sources of information available on an effect 
he/she would perceive a covariation of the observed effect and the cause.  Kelley (1967) 
identified similarities in the process of making attributions and the process of analysing 
experimental data, for example, the analysis of contributing factors.  He suggested that 
attributors acted like scientists in analyzing the available information which developed into his 
‘man-scientist-model’.  He argued that the logic of the covariation principal was similar to that of 
the statistical model of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) and as a result he conceptualised his 
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covariation principle using the ANOVA framework to develop the Kelley ANOVA cube (figure 
3). 
 
In the ANOVA model, the potential causes are the independent variables and the effects to be 
explained are the dependant variables.  Kelley (1967) classified the potential causes into three 
types: causes that describe the stable properties of the person, causes that refer to the stable 
characteristics of the entity, and causes that refer to the stable characteristics of the circumstance. 
According to Kelley (1967), the effect is attributed to the factor with which it covaries. 
Simplified, “the effect is attributed to that condition which is present when the effect is present 
and which is absent when the effect is absent” (Kelley, 1967, p. 194).  Since the dependent 
variable is whether the effect occurs or not, in statistical terms, a covariation can be determined 
by analyzing if a manipulation of the independent variable results in a change to the dependant 
variable. 
 
The process can be used to analyse a spectator’s enjoyment of the Italians defeating the French to 
win the 2006 Soccer World Cup. In order to make an attribution on the effect the following 
questions should be posed: 
Was this the only game that the spectator enjoyed? (entity) 
If he watched the game again, will he still enjoy it? (circumstance: time) 
Assuming he watched it at the stadium, will he still enjoy it if he watched it on television set? 
(circumstance: modality) 




If the spectator answered “yes” to the questions then his enjoyment is attributed to the external 
factor (the game) and it can be concluded that it was a fantastic and memorable game.  However, 
if he answered “no” to questions 1 and 4 and “yes” to questions 2 and 3  than his enjoyment is 
attributed to the individual and it may be concluded that he is a soccer fanatic and enjoys 
watching all games, or he is an Italian fanatic and enjoyed their victory.  Kelley adds that the 
enjoyment could be attributed to “some juxtaposition of circumstance” (Kelley, 1967, p. 194); in 
this scenario, the spectators’ enjoyment could be a consequence of him having “World Cup 
fever”.   
 
These conditions have been represented, by Kelley (1967), in the form of a three-dimensional 
cube (see Figure 3).  The notations ‘X’, ‘Y’ and ‘Z’ represent possible effects (for example, 
enjoying the World Cup final game), ‘N’, ‘O’, ‘P’ and ‘Q’ represent entities (for example, 
different games during the World Cup), ‘T1M1’, ‘T2M1’, ‘T1M2’ and ‘T2M2’ represent 
different combinations of time and modality (for example, watching the match in the stadium and 
watching the match on television at home) and ‘self’, ‘O1’, ‘O2’ and ‘O3’ represent different 












Data pattern indicating attribution of effect Y to entity N. (in Kelley, 1967, p.195) 
In this illustration, ‘self’ (the soccer fan) experienced effect ‘Y’ (enjoyment of the game) when 
experiencing entity ‘N’ (watching the game) under different circumstance (live at the stadium, 
repeated at a bar, highlights at home, recorded on DVD).   However, person O1 (his friend) 
experienced ‘Y’ (enjoyment of the game) in response to entity ‘N’ (watching the game) for both 
modalities, but only at time two and not at time 1(at the bar and on DVD). Person O2 (his wife) 
did not experience ‘Y’ (enjoyment of the game) at all, and Person ‘O3’ (his son) experienced ‘Y’ 
(enjoyment of the game) in response to entity ‘N’ (watching the game) only for the second time 
and second modality (on DVD).  The covariation principle implies that enjoyment for the 
spectator (effect) should be attributed to something to do with the spectator (the stable properties 
of the person) since he enjoyed the match (entity) every time he watched it (circumstances).  
 
Kelley (1967) introduced labels for covariation information that correspond to the effect and 
causes. They are:  
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Distinctiveness: the impression is attributed to the thing if it uniquely occurs when 
the thing is present and does not occur in its absence. 
Consistency over time: each time the thing is present, the individual’s reaction must 
be the same or nearly so. 
Consistency over modality: his [sic] reaction must be consistent even though his 
mode of interaction with the thing varies 
Consensus: attributes of external origin are experienced in the same way by all 
observers  
(1967, p. 197) 
Consensus informs the attributor on the extent that the effect covaries with persons, 
distinctiveness informs about variations in effect with entities, and consistency concerns 
covariations of the effect with time and modality.  Kelley hypothesised that individuals use the 
criteria to ask different types of questions in order to gain a holistic picture of the situation.  The 
distinctiveness question asks “How does the person’s behaviour vary across situations or with 
other people?”; the consistency question queries “How does the person behave at different times 
and in different situations?”; lastly, the consensus question refers to: “How does the person’s 
behaviour compare with that of other people in the same situation?” (Goldstein, 1994, p.723)   
 
Consistency information in research is rarely differentiated into over modality or time (cf. 
McArthur, 1972; Ruble & Feldman, 1976; Zuckerman, 1978).  It was mentioned above to 
provide the descriptions in the format originally used by Kelley (1967) and to inform the reader 
that this differentiation exists, however, the rest of the paper will follow suit with the majority of 
attribution research and will not differentiate between the types of consistency information in an 
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attempt to be consistent with the majority of the literature.  The criteria for the three information 
types can be either high or low resulting in six possible combinations.  The level of 
distinctiveness is determined by the presence or absence of the same type of stimulus in differing 
situations. The absence of the stimulus is an indication of high distinctiveness while the presence 
of the stimulus is an indication of low distinctiveness.  Consistency levels are determined by the 
frequency in which the behaviour occurs in similar situations, a larger frequency indicates high 
consistency and a smaller frequency is an indication of low consistency.  The level of consensus 
is determined by the number of people who behave in the same way in a situation, a larger 
number of people indicates high consensus and a smaller number indicates low consensus.  
Depending on the type of information and level, the attribution may be dispositional (to the 
person), situational (to the situation), or a combination of both.  The table below is an indication 
of the expected attributional outcomes for each type of information taken in isolation. 
Table 1:  
The expected outcomes 
 
Criteria High/Low Type of Attribution 
 Distinctiveness High Situational 
 Distinctiveness Low Dispositional 
 Consistency High Dispositional 
 Consistency Low Situational 
 Consensus High Situational 
 Consensus Low Dispositional 
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Kelley’s (1967) covariation principle assumes that causality can only be attributed in the 
presence of multiple responses2.  He identified patterns of information (high and low) that 
covaries to lead to attributions to the person, the entity or the circumstance.  These patterns are 
listed in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Covariation patterns that should lead to attributions to either the person, the entity or the 
circumstance 
 Information 
Attribution Consensus Distinctiveness Consistency 
Person Low Low High 
Entity High High High 
Circumstances Low High Low 
 
Kelly’s theory (1967) predicted that person attribution will be more frequent when a response is 
characterised by low consensus, low distinctiveness, and high consistency (L, L, H) than when 
no additional information is given regarding that response.  The theory also suggested that entity 
or stimulus attributions would be more frequent when a response is characterised by high 
consensus, high distinctiveness, and high consistency (H, H, H) than when no background or 
additional information is provided regarding that response.  Lastly, he predicted that 
circumstance attributions would be most frequent when the response is characterised by low 
consensus, high distinctive and low consistency (L, H, L). 
   
                                               




Although Kelley’s model was intuitive and theoretically elegant, empirical results were mixed.  
McArthur’s Contribution 
McArthur’s l972 article “The How and What of Why: Some Determinants and Consequences of 
Causal Attributions” was the first report of a study that was conducted to empirically test 
Kelley’s model.  The primary aim of this study was to identify the effects that consensus 
information and verb categories had on causal attribution (McArthur, 1972).  
The Design 
To achieve this aim, McArthur manipulated consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency 
information in accordance with Kelley’s model: the subjects were provided with information on 
the response of another person; such as: John laughed at the comedian.  The statements were 
made up of four different verb categories.  The categories were emotion (“Sue is afraid of the 
dog”), accomplishment (“George translated the sentence correctly”), opinion (“Bob thinks his 
teacher is fair”), and action (“Jack contributes large sums of money to charity”).  They also 
received three statements that represented one of the eight possible combinations of consensus, 
consistency, and distinctiveness information varied by high and low amounts.  They were asked 
to use the information to make an attribution about why the event occurred.  Subjects could 
attribute the event, to the person, stimulus, circumstance, or combination of the three.  The 
control group was only given the statement and no extra information.  All of the subjects were 





Kelly’s theory (1967) predicted that different patterns of information can be used to determine 
the attribution (cf. Table 2).  McArthur used this as a starting point and hypothesised that person 
attribution will be more frequent when there is low consensus, low distinctiveness, or high 
consistency (L,L,H) than when there is high consensus, high distinctiveness and low consistency 
(H,H,L).  This was based on the study by Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, and Ward (1968, cited 
in McArthur, 1972) who found that performance tended to be attributed to the person’s ability 
rather than to the difficulty of the task.  McArthur also hypothesised that stimulus attribution will 
be more frequent when there is high consensus, high distinctiveness, or high consistency 
(H,H,H) than if the types of information was low (L,L,L).  Her third hypothesis was that 
circumstance attribution would be more frequent when there is low consistency as opposed to 
when it is high (McArthur, 1972). 
 
In addition to her hypothesises, McArthur made predictions about behavior.  She provided 
definitions for two types of generalisations (response and stimulus): A response generalisation is 
that a person will make different responses to the same stimulus and stimulus generalisation 
means that a person will make the same response to other stimuli.  With regards to these 
definitions she made two predictions, the first being: The variables that cause stimulus attribution 
also produce a greater expectancy for the actor to exhibit response generalisation.  Her second 
prediction was that the variables that produce person attribution also produce a greater 





The results of the study supported the predictions made by both Kelley and McArthur.  The 
combination of high consensus, high distinctiveness, and high consistency information (HHH) 
produced more stimulus attribution than no information.  Low consensus, low distinctiveness and 
high consistency combined (LLH), produced greater person attribution than no information.  
Low consistency produced more circumstance attribution than high consistency information.  
High consistency, high consensus, and high distinctiveness each produced more stimulus 
attribution than low consensus, low consistency and low distinctiveness.  Low consensus, low 
distinctiveness, and high consistency each produced more person attribution than high 
consensus, low distinctiveness, and low consistency respectively (McArthur, 1972) 
  
In terms of generalisations, McArthur found that high distinctiveness and high consensus each 
produced more stimulus attribution and a greater expectancy for response generalisation than did 
low consensus and low distinctiveness information.  Low consensus and low distinctiveness each 
produced more person attributions and a greater expectancy for stimulus generalisation than did 
high consensus and high distinctiveness information.  McArthur’s (1972) test of Kelley’s 
hypothesis demonstrated that consensus information had less impact on attributions as compared 
to consistency or distinctiveness information.  She found that consensus information accounted 
for less of the variance (< 1%) of both response and stimulus generalisation expectancies.  The 
study also found that attributions are influenced by the amount (high or low) and type of 
information presented (consensus, distinctiveness, consistency), as well as the verb type 




McArthur’s method has been replicated by other researchers (Frieze & Weiner, 1971, cited in 
Kelley & Michela, 1980; Ruble & Feldman, 1976; Zuckerman, 1978) who provided 
confirmation for the relative under-use of consensus information when interpreting success and 
failure (these works are discussed later).  McArthur’s work was pivotal in identifying the 
separate treatment of the different types of information, a topic that requires further elaboration.  
The Separate Treatment of the Different Types of Information 
Attribution research stemming from the work of Kelley (1967), has found that contrary to the 
expectations of Kelley’s basic model, the information types are treated or used differently by the 
participants when making attributions (Kelley & Michela, 1980; Harvey & Weary, 1984). The 
treatment varies from underuse of information to not being used at all.  The exact reason for the 
variation is uncertain; however, a large proportion of the empirical dissimilarities that were 
reported surrounded consensus information. 
 Consensus Information 
As mentioned previously, McArthur’s (1972) study found that consensus information had less 
impact on attributions as compared to consistency or distinctiveness information.  McArthur’s 
results were replicated and expanded by other researchers (see Orvis, Cunningham, & Kelley, 
1975, McArthur, 1976).  
 
 Major (1980) supported McArthur by reporting that when participants are given the choice to 
request information to explain the occurrence of an event, they requested consistency or 
distinctiveness information more frequently as compared to consensus information.  The 
participants in the study were given a description of a behavior and were asked to determine why 
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it occurred.  They were allowed to request as much information as they needed and whichever 
type they chose. Participants requested more consistency than distinctiveness or consensus 
information and most often they requested consistency first.  In comparison to the others, 
consensus information was requested less and used less.  
 
Ruble and Feldman (1976) hypothesised that the lesser impact of consensus information was a 
result of a recency effect.  This was based on the observation that McArthur (1972, 1976) and 
Orvis et.al (1975) both presented consensus information first, followed by distinctiveness and 
consistency information.  After counterbalancing the order of presentation, Ruble and Feldman 
found that all three types of information accounted for equal amounts of variance.  They 
concluded that consensus information only had a lesser effect on attributions than distinctiveness 
and consistency information when presented first (Ruble & Feldman, 1976). 
 
Based on the findings of Ruble and Feldman’s (1976) study, Zuckerman (1978) realised that the 
order of presentation would only have an effect on the use of information if the information was 
relevant to the attribution.  To test this theory, she examined the prediction that the order of 
presentation of the three types of information ‘affects the use of consensus information in the 
attribution of occurrences but not of action’ (Zuckerman, 1978, p. 649).  Her study analysed the 
effects when behaviours were either accompanied or not by the three types of information and 
when the information was presented in various orders over two conditions.  She found that 
consensus had a greater impact on attributions for occurrences than on attributions for actions.  
Zuckerman concluded that of Kelley’s three information variables, ‘consensus will have a 
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stronger impact when this behavior falls into the category of occurrences than when it is 
classified as an action’ (1978, p.656).  Ruble and Feldman (1976) and Zuckerman (1978) both 
indicated that the order of presentation resulted in the lesser impact of consensus information, 
however, Kelley and Michaela (1980) note that in both studies consensus was the only 
information that was affected by order of presentation.  They concluded that “there remains the 
possibility that the three kinds of information are treated differently” (1980, p.463). 
 
Nisbett and Borgida (1975) found that, in contrast to Kelley’s model, people do not use 
consensus information extensively.  They conducted a study in which two previously conducted 
psychology experiments were described to subjects.  In the previous experiment participants 
were faced with the predicament of assisting someone in need.  The participants in the current 
study were divided into a consensus group, who were informed about the behaviour of the 
participants in the previous experiment, and a control group who were not given any additional 
information.  Participants were required to explain the behaviour of the participants that did not 
assist the person in need; it was hypothesised that the additional consensus information would 
impact on the explanations.  However, the results indicated that the consensus information did 
not influence the attributions (Nisbett & Borgida, 1975).  
 
Previous research by Nisbett and his collaborators (Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, & Reed, in press 
cited in Nisbett & Borgida, 1975) also argued for the lesser weight of consensus information.  
Consensus information was manipulated in three depression and negative moods studies by 
providing the participants with information which indicated that their experiences (depression 
and negative moods) were common.  It was hypothesised that the additional consensus 
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information would affect the participant’s attribution for the cause of their negative mood, by 
shifting it from them to the situation.  An attribution to the self had the additional implication of 
psychology incompetence which let the experimenters to assume that most participants would 
use the consensus information to avoid the implication.  The results, however, indicated that 
consensus information had no effect (Nisbett & Borgida, 1975).  
 
Realising  that those experiments with mood changes had constraints; Nisbett et al. (in press 
cited in Nisbett & Borgida, 1975) conducted a second experiment, which manipulated consensus 
information.  In this experiment participants were required to taste several crackers (they were 
misinformed that the experiment was to evaluate the crackers) and they were required to drink a 
solution between eating crackers (the solution was meant to neutralise the effects of the previous 
cracker).  The consensus manipulation involved the subjects ‘finding out’ (they had to leave their 
solution bottles with other bottles that they were told were used on the same day) that they drank 
more or less of the solution than other participants.  Participants were questioned with various 
alternatives on why they had drunk more or less of the solution.  The experimenters hypothesised 
that participants would attribute drinking the solution to the fact that they were thirsty when they 
were provided with information that suggested that other participants did not drink a lot of the 
solution.  They also hypothesised that the participant would attribute drinking the solution to the 
cracker being salty when the participants were provided with information that suggested that 
other participants drank a lot of the solution.  Like the in the previous experiment, the consensus 
manipulation had no effect since participants did not use consensus information as hypothesised 
(Nisbett & Borgida, 1975).  Nisbett and Borgida cited other studies that supported their 
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conclusion of consensus information having no effect on attributions (cf. Cooper, Jones, & 
Tuller, 1972; Miller, Gillen, Schenker, & Radlove, 1973 both cited in Nisbett & Borgida, 1975).  
   
Wells and Harvey (1977) suggested that Nisbett and Borgida’s argument was intrinsically 
flawed.  They felt that Nisbett and Borgida, as well as the researchers that they cited, found no 
effect for consensus information as a result of insufficient ‘operationalisation of either the 
dependant or the independent variable’ (Wells & Harvey, 1977, p.280).  Wells and Harvey 
replicated Nisbett and Borgida’s study, changing the operationalisation of consensus ‘to reflect 
Kelley’s conceptual criterion of perceived covariation and to represent more levels of consensus’ 
(Wells & Harvey, 1977, p. 279).  Their study, which implemented a stronger operationalisation 
of consensus information and an emphasis on the random selection and representativeness of the 
consensus sample, found that ‘consensus information significantly affected attributions in 
manner consistent with attribution theory predictions’ (Wells & Harvey, 1977, p.291). 
 
Pilkonis (1977) concurred with Wells and Harvey on the importance of operationalisation of 
variables.  His study employed a questionnaire format to investigate the impact of consensus 
information on causal inferences.  Participants were required to read a research proposal and 
indicate their expectations about the likely behaviours of participants.  Next, they received 
consensus information in the guise of pretest results, after which they were required to make 
judgments about the dispositional and situational causes of behaviour.  The results indicated that 
dispositional attributions were affected by consensus information, however, situational 
attributions were unaffected by the manipulation (Pilkonis, 1977).  Pilkonis’s (1977) study adds 
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further support to the earlier findings of McArthur (1972) that consensus information is treated 
differently than predicted by Kelley (1967). 
 
The reviewed studies have reported that consensus information is not used in the same manner as 
distinctiveness and consistency information.  The exact findings of the use of consensus 
information varies from that in comparison with  distinctiveness and consistency information, 
participants do not request consensus information to explain events as frequently (Major, 1980) 
to findings that consensus information was affected by order of presentation (Ruble & 
Feldman,1976; Zuckerman, 1978).  Numerous other studies provide empirical support with 
findings that consensus information has no effect on attributions (cf. Cooper, Jones, & Tuller, 
1972; Miller, Gillen, Schenker, & Radlove, 1973 both cited in Nisbett & Borgida, 1975). 
Overall, the collective findings of these studies do not offer any conclusive reason for the sparse 
use of consensus information.  However, they are unanimous in that consensus information is not 
used in the same manner as distinctiveness and consistency information. 
Distinctiveness and Consistency Information 
There appears to be fewer studies conducted exclusively on distinctiveness or consistency 
information.  However, studies like McArthur’s (1972), and others mentioned above, indicate 
that both consistency information and distinctiveness information have a larger impact on 
attributions by highlighting the weaknesses of consensus information.  
 
Enzel, Harvey and Wright (1980, in Harvey & Weary, 1984) found effects of distinctiveness 
information, with the presence of high distinctiveness resulting in less extreme evaluations of 
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acts than low distinctiveness.  However, they found that distinctiveness had no effect when the 
participants interacted with an actor (Enzel et al.). 
 
Gerard (1963) and Misra (1973) (both in Kelley & Michela, 1980) found that participants used 
their own experiences (if there was consistency) instead of social comparison information.  
Harvey and Kelley (1974, in Kelley & Michela, 1980) demonstrated that consistency in personal 
judgements assists in self assessments of competency.  Kelley and Michela cite studies (Irwin & 
Smith, 1956, Schwartz & Smith 1976) that indicate participants use consistency and 
distinctiveness information to make comparative judgements.  Himmelfarb (1972, in Kelley & 
Michela, 1980) found that consistency carried more weight when observed in different situations.  
Kelley and Michela cite additional studies that support the attribution of inconsistent behaviour 
to circumstances (Frieze & Weiner, 1971; Karaz & Perlman, 1975; Hayden & Mischel, 1976).  
Thibaut and Riecken’s (1955, in Kelley, 1967) study indicated that consistency criteria may be 
more important to the individual than the consensus criterion.  
 
In most studies consistency and distinctiveness information is used in the manner predicted by 
Kelley’s (1967) ANOVA cube model.  However, the reduced or minimal use of consensus 
information remains a mystery, despite various attempts at explaining this puzzle. 
Attempts at Explaining the Use of Consensus Information 
Researchers have attempted to explain the anomalous or sparse use of consensus information as 
evident in their empirical studies.  Various theories have emerged, but none has been accepted as 
the sole reason for the dissimilar treatment of the information types.  A few key explanations are 
discussed below.  
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Inadequate Operationalisation of Variables 
McArthur (1972) was the first researcher to identify the lesser impact of consensus information 
on causal attributions.  She hypothesised that the difference may be due to the operationalisation 
of the variables since distinctiveness information referred to a difference in effects with regards 
to objects, while consensus information referred to a difference in effects with regards to 
persons.  Secondly, McArthur suspected that distinctiveness information was stronger because its 
difference was in relation to entities, while with consensus information it was in relation to 
persons.  To elaborate, entities have no control and they lack intent, thus they will be perceived 
to be more stable.  Persons on the other hand have control and intent and will therefore be 
perceived as unstable.  It can be concluded that the stable distinctiveness information would be 
safer to use since it does not require consideration of additional factors (e.g. intent or ability).  
 
In a later paper, McArthur (1976) explained that the first hypothesis suggests that participants 
would accept information about objects or entities more easily, while they would search for 
alternative explanations when provided with information about a person.  Her second 
explanation is based on Anderson’s (1974, in McArthur, 1976) model which suggests that when 
providing data on a person’s effects on targets, distinctiveness information provides additional 
information on the person’s tendencies while when providing data on other peoples effects 
consensus information provides information on the challenges faced by the person.  He suggests 
that if perceiver’s perceptions of a person’s tendency are for some reason more impressionable 
than their perception of the entities challenges then they would use distinctiveness information 
more frequently than consensus information.  According to Anderson, distinctiveness 
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information would also be used more often if the perceiver assumes that the information about 
the persons tendencies were more relevant to the attribution. 
 
McArthur’s (1972) original study found equality between the information types when the entity 
targets (entity or stimulus) and agents (persons) were both persons (e.g. Jon laughed at Bob), but 
distinctiveness information gained greater efficacy when the target was a thing (e.g. Bob kicked 
the ball).  Thus, she designed a second study (1976) to systematically test the hypothesis that the 
different treatment of the two information variables was a result of a ‘person-thing variation’.  
The results indicated that, although consensus information was most effective when it was in 
relation to a person and distinctiveness information was most effective in relation to an object, 
distinctiveness information still had greater impact than consensus information.  It can be 
concluded that despite the manipulation, consensus information remains less effective in 
comparison to distinctiveness information. 
 
Thus, McArthur (1976) concluded that distinctiveness information was more influential because 
its difference was in relation to targets, whereas with consensus information it was in relation to 
agents.   Anderson’s (1974, in McArthur, 1976) model is once again cited as the reason for the 
different treatment, as it was concluded that “an agent’s proclivity [tendency] was perceived to 
be more likely to cause effects on things than on persons” (McArthur, 1976, p.740).  McArthur, 
like other researchers (Nisbett & Borgida, 1975; Wells & Harvey, 1977; Kassin, 1979; Wright, 





Kahneman and Tversky (1973) found that participants disregard category base rates3 (consensus 
information)  in a population when required to predict if an individual from the population 
belongs to a particular category.  Participants in the study did not follow Kelley’s rules of 
prediction, but were instead influenced by logic and focused on descriptions that were provided 
instead of the base rates.  Nisbett and Borgida (1975) explain that Kahneman and Tversky’s 
study only required “a direct inference from category base rate [consensus information] to the 
category membership”, while attribution “requires an inference from behavioural base rates to 
presumptions about the influence of situational forces” (Nisbett & Borgida’s, 1975, p.934).  
They hypothesized that if participants ignored the vital information of category base rate 
information when making category predictions, which is easier to apply, then participants cannot 
be expected to make complex predictions of causality based on behavioural base rate 
information.  The hypothesis is based on the representativeness heuristic which suggests that 
individuals would use the relevant information (such as category base information) to make 
decisions. Nisbett and Borgida (1975) designed a study to demonstrate that individuals ignore 
base rate behaviour information (consensus information based on behaviour) in the same manner 
that they ignore base rate category information (consensus information based on categories).  
 
Nisbett and Borgida’s (1975) study confirmed Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) findings. They 
concluded that participants ignoring consensus information in the same manner that they ignore 
                                               
3 Base rate, in this instance, refers to the probability of behaviour occurring based on the frequency of it occurring in 
the past. In attributions, base rate information is the same as consensus information (the prior behaviour of persons). 
It is therefore used interchangeably in this discussion.  
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base rate information was the explanation for its inadequate use in making attributions.  It is 
suggested that the nature of the information types may play a role in consensus being ignored 
since consensus information is “abstract” while distinctiveness information is more “concrete, 
bright and salient” (1975, p. 943).  McArthur (1976) makes the same argument as Nisbett and 
Borgida, adding that Kahneman and Tversky’s study may confirm her previously mentioned 
theory of participants viewing an agent’s likes as more important than dislikes.  She links 
specific case information to the likes of people, and base rate information to their dislikes 
(McArthur, 1976).  Hansen and Donoghue (1977, in Kelley & Michela, 1980) agree that 
consensus information is ignored. However they suggest that participants use their own 
behaviour to predict how others would act.  This supports McArthur’s conclusion that: “An 
individual who is attempting to determine the cause of another person’s behaviour already has 
one bit of consensus information – what (he [sic] thinks) his own behaviour would be in this 
situation” (1972, p.184).  She suggests that distinctiveness is therefore more informative than 
consensus information, thus it is utilised more often when the attribution is for an object.  
Inadequate Research Designs and Methodology 
Wells and Harvey’s (1977) study suggested that Nisbetts and Borgida’s findings may have been 
a result of their operationalisation of consensus information.  They criticised the literature that 
Nisbett and Borgida cited, in particular the choice of dependant variables (for Miller, Gillen, 
Schenker, & Radlove, 1973; Nisbett et al., 1976), and the operationalisation of consensus 
information (for McArthur, 1972; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975; Nisbett et al., 1976,).  Wells and 
Harvey also suggest that Kahneman and Tversky found a significant overall effect for base-rate 
information in their study, and that the wording of their results have been misinterpreted (1977).  
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However, when correctly interpreted, the findings suggest that base-rate information is used-but 
sparingly.  Thus, this theory may still be relevant.  
 
Like Wells and Harvey, Pilkonis (1977) places an emphasis on the methodology and design.  He 
criticised the use of paper and pencil methods (a method used by a larger number of attributional 
researchers), stating that they produced a variety of results which were occasionally unrelated 
and lacked reliability.  Pilkonis suggests that improved paradigms and enhanced dependent 
variables would produce more accurate results.  He suggests the use of alternative methods such 
as observations of behaviour (actual or videotaped) with improved measures (1977).  Harvey and 
Weary (1984) suggest that specific experimental conditions affect the use of consensus 
information, such as the type of information used and its presentation (Kassin, 1979 and 
Solomon, Drenan, & Insko, 1981,).  
 
There have been several attempts to explain anomalous use of consensus information (anomalous 
compared to that predicted by Kelley, 1967) ranging from methodology choices to problems in 
the operationalisation of variables.  However, there are no conclusive results as no single attempt 
has succeeded in providing an explanation.  What has emerged is the common opinion that the 
nature of consensus information may be the key to understanding the different treatment of 
information.  This stream of thought will be explored next.  
The Problematic Nature of Consensus Information 
The previous section discussed the various alternatives that were identified as possibly 
responsible for the difference in efficacy of the different information types.  While it is possible 
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that the reported anomaly is due to methodological failures in representing consensus 
information in experimental manipulations and measures (cf. McArthur, 1972; Pilkonis, 1977; 
Wells & Harvey, 1977), it is also possible to argue that consensus information is largely ignored 
in attributions of causality (McArthur, 1972; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975).  There is nevertheless 
general agreement that consensus information is used differently than Kelley’s (1967) model 
would predict.   
The Social Nature of Consensus Information 
Nisbett and Borgida (1975) suggested that the “nature of the information” may affect its 
treatment.  Consensus information has a social nature that burdens it with implications.  The 
implication is a link to persons.  Persons and personality, by nature are unstable or unpredictable 
to a degree.  Consensus information (by association) may be viewed as being less stable.  The 
stability issue arises from the quality of social consensus information available to the attributor.  
Social consensus information is the information that the attributor collects from past and present 
experiences, both personal and observed, as well as social sources (e.g. media) (Kelley, 1967).  
Kelley (1967, p. 198) explains that when observing attributions “we are assuming that both the 
person’s own consistency evidence and the evidence from social consensus contributes to the 
stability of his own reaction”.  Kelley identifies social consensus as the key to making a stable 
attribution. 
 
The primary threat to stability is social influence, as additional information or pressure may 
result in changes in attributions.  Kelley (1967) identified that susceptibility to social influence 
increases when individuals feel inadequate to handle a situation.  He suggests that vulnerability 
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may be due to one or a combination of the following factors: a lack of social support; insufficient 
information; the problem has a high level of difficulty; or a lack of self confidence.  Kelley 
suggests that in an attempt to satisfy the consensus criterion, individuals would attempt to 
influence those who are vulnerable in order to produce a common attribution.  He concluded that 
a common attribution is an indication of consensus aiding the attribution process. 
 
According to Deutsch and Gerrard (1955, in Brown, 1996), influence is categorised as being 
either informational or normative influence.  Normative influence stems from an individuals’ 
need to gain social approval and acceptance while avoiding rejection.  They are therefore 
influenced into making an attribution based on what is expected as opposed to the available 
information.  Informational influence occurs when an individual accepts information to be 
reliable evidence and bases an attribution on the new information.  
Informational Influence 
Sherif’s (1936, in Brown, 1996) study, which employed optical illusions to demonstrate how 
individual’s behaviours are influenced in social situations, is thought to be an example of 
informational influence in practice.  In the study participants accepted the false information 
provided by actors as reliable, and consequently made incorrect judgments.  Brown (1996) 
suggests that they were influenced due to acceptable behavioural norms, which encouraged 
social interaction.  
Normative Influence 
Asch’s (1952, in Brown, 1996) classic experiment on social and personal conditions that increase 
susceptibility to pressure is an example of normative influence.  The study indicated that 
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individual differences and cultural expectations affect susceptibility to influence.  In contrast, 
Milgram’s (1974, in Brown, 1996) obedience to authority study suggested that the situation is 
responsible for susceptibility to influence and not personal characteristics.  Brown suggests that 
the influence is a result of social power and not a need for approval. 
 
Ring (1964, in Kelley, 1967) and Thibaut and Riecken (1964, in Kelley, 1971) both found that 
the status of the actor affects attributions.  Ring found that agreement could be caused by an 
actor’s role.  He stated that the agreement is a result of the actor’s high power or status and not 
the quality of their ideas.  Thibaut and Riecken’s found that behaviours associated with high 
status are attributed to external factors.  Kelley suggests that “noncompliance in this situation is 
likely to be viewed as a perfunctory manifestation of B’s power without regard to the worth of 
the statement to which he is meant to respond” (1971, p.13). 
 
Enzel et al. (1980, in Harvey & Weary, 1984) also found evidence of an actor’s role affecting the 
attribution process.  Their findings indicated that greater interactions of participants with an actor 
resulted in the attribution of more positive qualities to the actors when positive acts occurred, in 
other words, the disregarding of distinctiveness information.  Enzel et al. (1980) found that 
distinctiveness information was more influential when there was less interaction between 
participants and actors.  Unlike the previous studies, this effect does not appear to be a result of 
status; instead it appears to be a result of social interaction.  This would support the assumption 
of theorists that behaviour is influenced by social features that are created by social interactions 




Kelley’s (1950, in Harvey & Weary, 1984) warm-cold study concurred by indicating a link 
between attribution and social interaction.  College students were provided with information that 
a visiting instructor was “rather warm” or “rather cold” (Harvey & Weary, 1984, p. 445). The 
results suggested that the students’ interactions with the instructor were dependant on attributions 
that they made about him.  The attributions were based on how he interacted with previous 
students (distinctiveness), students perceptions of him (consensus) and his interactions at other 
times (consistency).  They formed positive perceptions of him when they were provided with 
information that lead them to conclude that the instructor would be warm and negative 
perceptions when they were told he would be cold.  This study demonstrated a relationship 
between attribution, social perception and social interaction (Harvey & Weary, 1984).  Kelley 
(1971, p.1) explains “Each individual answers these attributional questions for himself [sic], and 
in each case the answer he reaches affects his behaviour in the interaction and his attitudes 
toward the other person”.  Thus the study also suggests a relationship between social perception 
and interaction.  Kelley suggests that “…the attributor is merely a powerless observer, 
processing information regarding covariation as it is presented by the natural flow of social 
interaction” (Kelley, 1971, p.4). He points out that in social interaction the participant has the 
dual role of causal agent and attributor since his behaviour may influence what he is attempting 
to understand (1971). 
 
  Additional studies (Town & Harvey, 1981; Yarkin, Town, & Harvey, 1981; both in Harvey & 
Weary, 1984) attempted to identify the influence of information about a person on social 
interaction with the person.  The results indicated that positive information produces positive 
attributions and behaviour. Tetlock (1980, in Harvey & Weary, 1984) found that causal 
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information provided by the actors on outcomes affects participants’ evaluations of them.  
Harvey and Weary suggest that this may be a consequence of the participants having a modest 
amount of consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus information with regards to the actors.  
 
 The findings of these studies indicate that interactions influence attributions and attributions 
influence interactions.  This suggests that social influences and pressures have an impact on 
attributions and the social context of attribution makes impact on the process.  The exact impact 
of these strategies requires further elaboration. 
Attribution Research in a Social Context 
Research indicates that social strategies influence the reported perception of causality.  Social 
strategies may be used to support and explain other findings in attribution research.  Jones and 
Davis suggested that social desirability was a factor in their theory of correspondent inferences 
(1965).  They questioned the validity of individual’s responses when they identified with actors. 
Jones and Davis argued that some reported attributions were a result of the individuals being 
aware of the consequences and the cultural desirability for specific responses.  They elaborate 
with “Most people want to avoid embarrassing others by not meeting their expectations, most 
people want to gain the rewards implicit in approval from authority figures, most people want to 
manifest their intelligence by showing that they understand what is required of them” (1965, 
p.236).  
 
 Kelley (1971) concurs, and hypothesises that, in an attempt to gain the desirable consequences; 
individuals may use their knowledge of social pressures, shared values, and situational demands 
to estimate the degree to which a particular response is expected from them.  He warned that if 
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the individuals were confident that their estimates were accurate, the estimates would replace the 
actual observation of consensus information, forming the basis of the attribution.  
 
However, in spite of these suggestions that the social nature of consensus may set it apart from 
consistency and distinctiveness information, this possibility has not yet been explored.  
Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) have developed their concept of social representation which 
attempts build the social link. 
Social representations 
Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) suggest that the explanations for attributions need to be 
considered together with the societal beliefs in order for the theory to be rendered more social.  
They hypothesise that common sense knowledge can be divided into two forms, one which can 
be classified by science and the other which is a transformation of new scientific knowledge into 
everyday language. 
 
According to (Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983), most people act as unskilled scientists.  The 
statement is based on people’s use of information in making attributions. Moscovici and 
Hewstone question the notion of man-the-scientist due to the fact that the hypothetical person is 
assumed to have no prejudices, no conceptual knowledge, somebody who is as naïve as a young 
innocent child.  They suggest that we assume three things: an innocent outlook, neutrality 
towards the world, the clearness of information with which he deals.  However, the question 




Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) hypothesise that they don’t always follow the logical manner as 
hypothesised by Kelley (1967).  Instead, they suggest that perceivers use social representations 
when forming attributions.  Social representations are defined as common-sense theories about 
key aspects of society that are used to reduce confusion and create a common understanding of 
information. 
 
Next they focus on the attribution of outcomes to persons instead of situations which is generally 
referred to as the ‘fundamental attribution error’ and it is assumed that situational information is 
ignored.  They explain this issue from a social representative point of view in that information 
that refers to the person is seen as being more real due to dominant cultural representations. 
Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) suggest that the misinterpretations may be part of the working 
system of society.  They suggest that other attribution puzzles may also be explained by their 
theory that it is due to people classifying information differently.  
 
People are different; therefore attributions will be made based on our different backgrounds. 
They suggest that attribution theorists believe that there is only one theory, when in fact there are 
several.  Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) have raised the issue of people having different 
backgrounds and with the backgrounds come different perspectives and possible bias. 
Researchers have to therefore be vigilant of additional negative social influences such as those 
addressed by the Social Attribution Theory. 
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Social Attribution Theory 
Social Attribution Theory suggests that in some circumstances respondents may modify their 
response in ways to meet the norms and expectations that they perceive are held by the 
interviewer (Johnson, Fendrich, Shaligram, Garcy & Gillespie, 2000).  The theory contends that 
respondents construct interviewer norms based on cues such as the interviewer’s appearance, 
speech, accent and mannerisms.  
 
According to Johnson et al. respondents may assume that the interview has particular beliefs 
based on the information they have.  In most cases, the respondent only has information about 
the interviewer’s demographic information.  Johnson et al conducted a study to use social 
attribution theory to evaluate the effects of interview characteristics in substance use surveys. 
The study did not support the social attribution theory.  The theory received support when Lord, 
Friday, and Brennan (2005) examined the influence of interviewers’ characteristics on providing 
consent.  
 
Heeb and Gmel (2001, p. 434) in their study on interviewer and respondents effects in a Swiss 
Health Survey suggested that respondents “…may modify or revise, or “edit,” their response for 
social desirability (i.e., make it meet some perceived social norm)”.  Their study also provided 
support for the model by identifying interviewer effects caused by age and gender in the sample.  
This led them to conclude that editing responses for social desirability may be responsible for 




The Impact of Social Features of Attribution on the Use of Consensus Information 
The present study explores the hypothesis that it is the social nature of consensus information 
that results in its anomalous contribution to attribution as predicted by Kelley’s (1967) model.  It 
is hypothesised that since attributions take place in a social context with social information 
(consensus information) and have social implications, people form and report attributions with 
respect to the nature of the social context.  The assumption is that the accurate attribution is 
compromised when individuals prioritise the demands of the social context over strict veridical 
attributional accuracy as assumed by Kelley’s (1967) model and most other cognitive models of 
attribution. 
 
It is hypothesised that individuals would socially analyse the attributed causality and if it is 
judged to be internal, controllable and intentional, the revealing of the reason would be judged to 
be socially weighty.   In the case of attributing responsibility for a positive outcome, this could 
be socially desirable, but if the outcome is negative then attributing the cause of the outcome to 
an agent could be socially risky and disrupt the social fabric.  The socially risky attributions may 
result in socially disruptive situations.  In these situations it is hypothesised that social demands 
over-rule strict attribution accuracy and consensus information is under-utilised.  
 
Based on these hypotheses, it is deduced that depending on the social context, the outcome of an 
interaction would be either an attribution using consensus information as predicted by Kelley’s 
ANOVA model (in a socially safe context) or influenced by the social context to provide a 
socially acceptable response (in a socially risky context).  Thus the social nature of consensus 
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information and the notion of social risk may explain in the unpredictability of consensus 
information.   
 
The implication is that, if social norms were ignored, consensus information might be used in a 
predictable manner.  Alternatively, if the risk of the social context were increased, individuals 
might make more ‘false’ but socially acceptable attributions.  The impact of social factors has 
not been considered with respect to Kelley’s model and doing so might explain the anomalous 
use of consensus information in practice.  
 
There is no known direct research on the impact of the social context on the attribution process 
as a possible explanation for the anomalies surrounding consensus information. This has been 
identified as a gap in attribution research and is the aim of this project.  It is anticipated that the 
findings will assist in identifying the reasons for the different treatment of the information types. 
Although this anomaly is now a ‘stale’ issue that has not received much attention for  two 
decades, the continued, and apparently increasing, citation of Kelley’s model of attribution in 
current research justifies revisiting this problem. 
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Method and Design 
Aims and Hypotheses 
The aim of this study is to explore the use of consensus information in making attributions. 
Research on the topic has identified that consensus information is under used or not used at all in 
comparison to distinctiveness and consistency information during the attribution process. This 
under use of consensus information has resulted in the formation of attributions that are not 
predicted by Kelley’s (1967) model which is a phenomenon that remains unexplained in the 
literature. This study will attempt to provide more clarity on the under use of consensus 
information by exploring the impact of social situations on the use of consensus information 
when making attributions.  It is hypothesised that consensus information is distinguished from 
consistency or distinctiveness information by its social nature and its use is therefore more 
sensitive to specific features of the social contexts in which attributions are made.  Thus the 
experiment was designed to investigate the impact of the riskiness of a social context on making 
attributions.   
 Design 
Design Considerations 
The reviewed literature (McArthur, 1972; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975; Pilkonis, 1977; Wells & 
Harvey, 1977) identified a poor research design as a possible explanation for the misuse of 
consensus information. An improved design was formulated based on this criticism. McArthur 
(1972) is the pioneer in the field which has resulted in her study being established as the template 
for subsequent research. Most researchers have used written statements and questions in their 
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studies to which participants were required to give paper-and-pencil responses. This 
methodology in research on causal attribution has been criticised because words, phrases and 
statements in the English language have specific consensual attribution implications (Brown & 
Fish 1983). As a consequence, the results of research using written vignettes are questionable. It 
can be argued that participants made specific attributions by taking cues provided by the verb use 
and wording in the statements, thus rendering them invalid as measures of cognitive attribution 
processes. 
Methodological problems 
Newcombe and Rutter (1982) have identified five methodological problems that affect ANOVA 
theory and research.  
The formulation of instructions. 
A variable that is neglected is the influence that variations in instructions to subjects can have on 
their responses.  Instructions are expressed in a mixture of academic and informal language.  
When psychology students are used, the problem increases since they may pick up on cues 
easily. 
The choice of stimulus events. 
A second drawback is the widespread and hazardous procedure of presenting stimulus material 
in the form of simple verbal descriptions of behavior.  There are many problems with this 
method, the most common being the presentation, manipulation, validation and contextualisation 
of experimental stimuli.  Problems with presentation are based on the fact that they are verbal 
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and may include uncontrolled variations.  Secondly, they indicate that visual media is not used 
even though this would solve a large number of the problems faced with the verbal criteria. 
The manipulation of information variables. 
The presenting to subjects of pre-coded information packages is problematic as well since it does 
not account for the choice that the participants would make if they were not restricted.  Secondly, 
these methods also include problems such order effects (Ruble & Feldman, 1976) and 
information redundancy (Kassin, 1979).  
The choice of attribution measures. 
Explanation measures are criticized for restricting possible attributions to a few abstract 
theoretical categories.  The forced-choice and scaling methods are commonly used and these 
methods do not empirically validate the causal attribution categories.   
The application of process probing methods. 
They suggest that methods and tools used for investigating cognitive processes should be used.  
These tools are thought to be more useful in probing the cognitive process of social inferences 
 Current Design 
To counter this problem, the current instrument used visual material in the form of video 
vignettes.  The video vignettes were designed to depict an Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) 
transaction occurring under different circumstances.  The circumstances were created to reflect 
the combinations of consensus, consistency and distinctiveness information that Kelley (1967; 
1973; Orvis, Cunningham, & Kelley, 1975) identified as resulting in attributions to persons, 









Attribution Consensus Distinctiveness Consistency 
Person Low Low High 
Entity High High High 
Circumstances Low High Low 
 
Consensus information refers to how the person’s behaviour compares with that of others in a 
similar situation and was depicted by using two visually different actors.  Consistency refers to 
how the person behaves at different times and in different situations and was represented by the 
use of two different times (day and night).  Distinctiveness refers to how the person’s behaviour 
varies across situations or with different people and was depicted by the use of two visually 
distinctive ATMs. 
 
Observations of ATM user behaviour in malls were made in order to develop a template script 
that would be followed when filming the clips to ensure that the stimuli were (a) realistic; and (b) 
the transactions under the different conditions would be similar in pace, length and affect.  The 





Each clip depicted an actor walking up to an ATM and attempting to withdraw money.  Four 
variables were manipulated in the video clips: namely the identity of the user (consensus); 
whether the left or right ATM machine was used (distinctiveness); the time of day (consistency) 
and the failure or success of the withdrawal (outcome).  These variables were represented as 
follows: 
Consensus information. 
Consensus information was operationalised by showing two visibly different ATM users 
experiencing different outcomes in the same situation.  The researcher acted as one of the ATM 
users due to the nature of the experimental manipulation which will be discussed below and an 
actor played the role of the second user.  They dressed in a similar manner (blue jeans, long 
sweaters and similar shoes) in order to minimize participants making attributions based on their 
appearance.  However, they were visibly different so that the participants could tell them apart. 
This was achieved by only one of them (the researcher) wearing a baseball cap.  The cap also 
assisted in hiding the identity of the researcher as was required by the design.  The names ‘Bob’ 
and ‘Jon’ were superimposed on the screen while they made their transaction.  These names 
which were taken from McArthur’s (1972) study are both ‘Western’, masculine and three letters 
long and  they were distinctive enough to allow attribution differentiation and similar enough to 
avoid unintended confounds, for example, related to any cultural connotations that might be 
related to each name. 
Distinctiveness information. 
The spatial location (left or right) of two ATM machines was used to provide distinctiveness 
information. Distinctiveness information was operationalised by the users experiencing constant 
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success at one ATM and constant failure at the other.  The ATM facility of one of the largest 
banking institutes at a local mall was selected for filming the clips because it fitted the 
researcher’s criteria of having more than one ATM in a quiet location which was large enough to 
accommodate the video recording needs.  
Consistency information 
Consistency information was operationalised by the users experiencing constant success during 
one time period and constant failure during the other.  Three pieces of information were used to 
show time: firstly, the time was displayed boldly against a dark background for a second at the 
start of each clip; secondly, the time of day was indicated at the bottom of the screen (as either 
“during office hours” or “after office hours”) for the duration of each clip; thirdly, a digital clock 
using the 24 hour format (e.g. 09:15, 21:15) was superimposed in an empty frame that was 
conveniently situated between the two ATMs and therefore appeared to be a real 24-hour clock 
in the recorded scene.  This was both necessary and possible since the clips were filmed using 
artificial lighting in a mall, which prevented the real time of day from being determined from 
environmental cues.  However, during analysis it emerged that more realistic cues, such as 
daylight versus night-time, may have been more effective. 
Outcome. 
The user was either successful at withdrawing the money or unsuccessful.  To operationalise 
success, the users were shown putting the withdrawn money into their wallets before walking 
away.  Alternatively, failure was depicted when the users turned back to look at the ATM, their 
body language showed disappointment and they replaced only the ATM card into their wallets 
before walking away. 
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The riskiness of the social context. 
The riskiness of the social context was manipulated in the research interview by the researcher 
either playing the role of a neutral researcher or by giving the impression that he was one of the 
ATM users in the clips.  It was hypothesised that when the participants were under the 
impression that the researcher was a neutral researcher they would be at ease and would have the 
freedom to make the ‘correct’ causal attribution (as predicted by Kelley,1967 in table 3), but 
when the participant was aware that the researcher was actually the person performing the 
transaction, their attributions would be oriented to the fact that attributing the cause of the failure 
to the actor would be socially risky and that this affect their reported attribution and, specifically, 
result in the under-use of consensus information as reported in the literature.  
The stimulus tapes. 
An introductory clip was created for inclusion at the beginning of each tape to introduce the 
variables to the participants.  Firstly, the actor Bob was introduced with a still image of him 
appearing for few seconds and his name appearing in a bright bold orange font.  Jon was next 
and he appeared for the same duration with the same sort of caption. Stills of the ‘time of day’ 
followed and the researcher pointed out the clock in the center of the screen and the caption at 
the bottom (either during office-hours or after office-hours).  Lastly the ATMs were introduced 
with the left first and then the right. Each clip was accompanied by the appropriate caption.  The 





To summarise, each clip showed one of the users (Bob or Jon) going to a specific ATM (either 
the left or the right), at a particular time of day (either during or after office hours) and they 
would either fail or succeed in making a withdrawal. Table 4, below, depicts the different clips 
that were shot. 
Table 4 
The 16 different video clips used to provide information 
Clip  Outcome Distinctiveness Consistency Consensus Duration  
Introduction   - Both Both Both 32:30 
1 Failure Left ATM Day ATM user  Bob 25:04 
2 Failure Left ATM Day ATM user  Jon 25:17 
3 Failure Left ATM Night ATM user  Bob 25:04 
4 Failure Left ATM Night ATM user  Jon 25:17 
5 Failure Right ATM  Day ATM user  Bob 26:05 
6 Failure Right ATM  Day ATM user  Jon 25:09 
7 Failure Right ATM  Night ATM user  Bob 26:05 
8 Failure Right ATM  Night ATM user  Jon 25:09 
9 Success Left ATM Day ATM user  Bob 30:14 
10 Success Left ATM Day ATM user  Jon 25:08 
11 Success Left ATM Night ATM user  Bob 30:14 
12 Success Left ATM Night ATM user  Jon 25:08 
13 Success Right ATM  Day ATM user  Bob 26:20 
14 Success Right ATM  Day ATM user  Jon 28:04 
15 Success Right ATM  Night ATM user  Bob 26:20 
16 Success Right ATM  Night ATM user  Jon 28:04 
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The clips were combined in different sequences to satisfy specific conditions.  To show low 
consensus, low distinctiveness and high consistency information for a person attribution the clips 
were combined to show one actor being successful in every transaction (a successful withdrawal 
of money), while the second actor constantly failed.  Low consensus, high distinctiveness, and 
low consistency information for a circumstance attribution was shown when the actors were only 
successful during one time period (succeeded during office hours only or after office hours only) 
and constantly failed at the alternative time.  Lastly high consensus, high distinctiveness, and 
high consistency information for an entity outcome was provided when the actors succeeded 
when using one machine but constantly failed when using the second.  Each type of information 
was depicted differently in two tapes (e.g. In Person: Jon, Bob constantly succeeded while Jon 
constantly failed, and in Person Bob, Jon constantly succeeded while Bob constantly failed), 
resulting in the creation of six tapes.  Due to resource constraints it was not possible to fully 
randomize the sequence of clips in each tape for every showing or to follow a Latin-square 
design so, as a compromise it was decided that the outcome of the clips would follow the random 
sequence of: success, failure, success, success, failure, failure, success, failure.  The order of the 
clips was randomly selected using the Microsoft Excel random number generating function but 










 The sequence of clips used to create the different tapes 
 
 Clip Sequence 
Attribution Success/Failure 
 S F S S F F S F 
Person: Jon 13 8 11 9 4 2 15 6 
 Person: Bob 14 5 12 10 7 3 16 1 
 Circumstance: Night 9 8 14 13 7 4 10 3 
 Circumstance: Day 16 6 11 15 5 1 12 2 
 Entity: Right ATM 11 8 9 10 6 5 12 7 
Entity: Left ATM 16 3 13 15 4 2 14 1 
 
The extent to which the participants experienced the vignettes in a neutral or social context was 
also manipulated by the researcher taking on a neutral role or acknowledging that he was the 











The 12 conditions 
  Condition Vignette Type Researcher Role 
 1 Person: Jon Neutral Researcher 
 2 Person: Bob Neutral Researcher 
 3 Circumstance: Night Neutral Researcher 
 4 Circumstance: Day Neutral Researcher 
 5 Entity: Right ATM Neutral Researcher 
 6 Entity: Left ATM Neutral Researcher 
 7 Person: Jon ATM User 
 8 Person: Bob ATM User 
 9 Circumstance: Night ATM User 
 10 Circumstance: Day ATM User 
 11 Entity: Right ATM ATM User 
 12 Entity: Left ATM ATM User 
 
Sample and Venue 
The Royal Agricultural Show was selected as the first site for the project.  This show is an 
annual event in Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal, that includes agricultural competitions, 
concerts, flea-market style trading, as well as a fun fair and various other entertainment 
attractions.  As a result, it is one of the largest gatherings of people in Pietermaritzburg as 
thousands of people attend the show over its week long duration.  This venue was chosen as it 
provided the researcher with access to a mixed and general population.  The University of 
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KwaZulu-Natal had a stand in a prominent position which was a convenient location for the 
researcher.  The researcher anticipated that, with regards to the younger attendants, participating 
in this research project could not compete with the many available attractions and it was decided 
that a second collection site was necessary to sample this group.  It was decided that the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg campus would be used as the second data 
collection site. 
 
Participants were selected on a voluntary basis if they met the requirement of being 18 years or 
older.  This criterion was selected to make consent issues simpler, as the researchers could avoid 
proxy consent.  The result was a mature sample that was capable of assisting the researcher.  A 
literacy test was used to determine if the participants were competent to notice and comprehend 
the written prompts in the video vignettes (such as the time of day) and to gather and use 
information from the vignettes to answer the researchers’ questions.  The literacy test required 
them to spot the difference between pairs of three sets of pictures.  Each set represented one of 
the three attribution variables (person, entity or circumstance).  In addition to screening 
participants, the test doubled as a way of priming participants about the essential information 

















A                                                                                B 
Figure 4 
Participants were required to spot the difference between A and B 
The researcher conducted the study on the balcony of the University of KwaZulu-Natal stand. 
The sides of the balcony were partitioned to provide the participants with privacy while they 
were viewing the clips and answering the questions.  The front was left open which did not 
compromise the privacy issue as it overlooked a river and was on an upper floor, however, it 
made the temperature and the glare of the afternoon sun a factor.  
Procedure  
Participants were approached by the researcher and requested to assist in the project.  They were 
provided with an incentive of being entered into a lucky draw for one of three shopping 
vouchers.  The project was explained to the prospective participant.  Once the participants agreed 
to assist the researcher, they were required to fill in a consent form and take the literacy test. 




Next the participants viewed one of the six tapes.  The tapes were selected based on a 
predetermined random order, to ensure that there were no order effects whilst ensuring that cells 
were similarly sized regardless of eventual sample size.  Thus the type of information they 
received varied according the selected tape.  Each tape began with an introduction that identified 
the variables that the participant should be aware of (the users, the ATMs and the time).  A 
preamble before each clip provided visual information about what the participant would see.  
The social context was manipulated, with the participant being informed that the researcher is the 
ATM user on the tape in some cases, or alternatively that he was a neutral and uninvolved 
researcher.  When the researcher took on the user role he dressed in the exact same clothes as 
worn in the tape (black cap, black sweater, and blue jeans with black shoes) and he had a name 
tag with the name ‘Jon’ (the name used in the tape).  He also introduced himself as Jon and 
tactfully informed the participant that he was the user in the tape.  The researcher changed his 
clothes (removed the cap and replaced the sweater with a blue t-shirt) and name tag (replaced Jon 
with his own name) when in the neutral researcher role.  Permission to audio record the 
participants responses was requested.  
The Measure 
The researcher interviewed the participants, asking them to make causal attributions on the 
circumstances in the clip.  A script was used to interview the participants so as to avoid any 
research bias.  Participants were asked the open-ended question of “So, what went wrong?” The 
open-ended question was used so as not to constrain their response and to avoid research biases 
which may have been caused by providing additional information or cues.  Participants provided 
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verbal responses that were audio recorded and the researcher recorded the response on a answer 
form.  
 
The researcher thanked them for their assistance and they were entered into a lucky draw to win 
shopping vouchers.  Additional information and a debriefing were provided when requested. A 
sample of 208 participants was collected containing both males and females. 
Preliminary Analysis 
A preliminary analysis was conducted before continuing the research at site B.  This was 
prompted by the researcher observing that participants were experiencing difficulties when using 
consistency information.  It was felt that the difficulty was a result of the operationalisation of 
consistency information, since it was provided abstractly in the form of an on-screen clock and 
by sub-titling in whether it was during or after office hours.  In comparison consensus and 
distinctiveness information was provided spatially and less abstractly by using different users 
and ATMs respectively.  The preliminary analysis indicated that consistency information was not 
being used when making attributions and it had no impact on the results.  With this in mind, a 
decision was taken to modify the experiment by dropping consistency information before 
continuing with the study.  This has the additional benefit of shortening the video vignette that 
each participant was required to watch.  Due to the fact that the analysis indicated that 
consistency information had no impact the researcher was confident that the results from the 





The original tapes were edited to remove the consistency information.  Tapes three and four 
(tapes in which circumstance attributions affected the outcome) were completely excluded and 
the clips that were included in the remaining tapes to provide consistency information were 
deleted.  The edited clock and time information at the bottom of the clips were removed as well. 
Below is a list of the clips that were used to create the new tapes. 
Table 7  
The remaining eight video clips 
Clip  Outcome Distinctiveness Consensus Duration 
Introduction   - Both Both 32:30 
1 Failure Left ATM ATM user  Bob 25:04 
2 Failure Left ATM ATM user  Jon 25:17 
5 Failure Right ATM  ATM user  Bob 26:05 
6 Failure Right ATM  ATM user  Jon 25:09 
9 Success Left ATM ATM user  Bob 30:14 
10 Success Left ATM ATM user  Jon 25:08 
13 Success Right ATM  ATM user  Bob 26:20 
14 Success Right ATM  ATM user  Jon 28:04 
 
The clip sequence was altered with the removal of the Consistency tapes and clips as indicated in 







 Table 8 
The removal of consistency information 
                                                                      
                      
Table 9 








 Clip Sequence 
Success/Failure S  F S S  F  F S  F 
Consensus A 13 8 11 9 4 2 15 6 
Consensus B 14 5 12 10 7 3 16 1 
Consistency A 9 8 14 13 7 4 10 3 
Consistency B 16 6 11 15 5 1 12 2 
Distinctiveness A 11 8 9 10 6 5 12 7 





Person: Jon 13 9 2 6 
 Person: Bob 14 5 10 1 
 Entity: Right ATM 9 10 6 5 
Entity: Left ATM 13 2 14 1 
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Once again, the participants experienced the vignettes in a social context (manipulated by the 
role of the researcher).  This additional variable applied to the four tapes provided the researcher 
with eight conditions as depicted in the table below. 
Table 10 
The eight conditions 
 
     Condition Vignette Type Researcher Role 
 1 Person: Jon Neutral Researcher 
 2  Person: Bob Neutral Researcher 
 5  Entity: Right ATM Neutral Researcher 
 6 Entity: Left ATM Neutral Researcher 
 7 Person: Jon ATM User 
 8  Person: Bob ATM User 
 11  Entity: Right ATM ATM User 
 12 Entity: Left ATM ATM User 
 
Procedure Followed at Second Site 
The University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg was used as the site to access the younger 
population.  The participants were selected on a voluntary basis and it was confirmed that each 
participant was 18 years old or over.  A second criterion was that they had not previously 




Permission was granted to the researcher to use a room in the Child and Family Centre which is 
located on the university campus to conduct his research.  He was provided with a private room 
and with a video monitor and recording equipment.  This location was ideal as it provided 
privacy and comfort and was located only a few meters from a busy thoroughfare used by 
students to travel between lecture venues.  Participants were approached by the researcher and 
requested to assist in the project.  They were provided with the incentive of a voucher (for one 
small juice and a chocolate) from the campus cafeteria.  The project was explained to the 
prospective participant.  Once the participants agreed to assist the researcher, they were required 
to fill in a consent form and take a revised literacy test.  The new test required them to identify 
the difference between two sets of two pictures.  Either consensus or distinctiveness information 
was represented in the pictures.  Their responses were recorded by the researcher on a question 
paper.  
 
Participants subsequently viewed one of the four tapes.  The tapes were chosen based on a 
predetermined random numerical order to permit an equal number of participants to view each 
tape.  Thus the type of information they received depended on the order they participated in. 
Each tape began with an introduction that identified the variables that the participant should be 
aware of (the users and the ATMs).  A preamble before each clip provided visual information 
about what the participant would see.  The social context was manipulated again, with the 
participant being informed that the researcher was the user depicted in the vignette in some cases 
or a neutral researcher in others.  The procedure remained the same, with the researcher dressing 
in the exact same clothes as worn in the tape (black cap, black sweater, and blue jeans with black 
shoes) and using the name tag ‘Jon’ (the name used in the tape) when he took on the user role. 
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When in the neutral role, he changed his clothes (removed the cap and replaced the sweater with 
a blue t-shirt) and switched name tags (replaced Jon with his own name).  
 
The same process was followed with permission to audio record the participants’ responses 
being requested, followed by the researcher then interviewing the participants, asking them to 
make causal attributions on the circumstances in the clip.  The same script was used as at the first 
site to maintain consistency and prevent research bias.  The researcher thanked them for their 
assistance and provided them with a voucher.  Additional information and a debriefing were 
provided when requested.  A sample of 96 participants was collected at this site containing both 




Of the 208 participants interviewed at the first site, the 70 participants who viewed tapes three 
and four had to be excluded due to the problematic issues surrounding the use of consistency 
information and its subsequent elimination from the design.  As a result of data cleaning 11 
participants were excluded since they did not provide an answer.  The preliminary analysis 
indicated that there was no effect of the consistency information and a second analysis indicated 
that there was no difference between the sites so the two sites were combined.  The total sample 
population for the project was therefore 223 participants. The data was coded to match the 
outcomes according to Kelley’s model (1973). 
Table 11 
 Justification for combining sites 
  Site 1 Site 2 Total Chi-square P-value 
Answer Incorrect 24 21 45   
 Correct 106 72 178   
Total  130 93 223 0.571 .450 
Information Consensus 64 46 110   
 Distinctiveness 66 47 113   
Total  130 93 223 0.001 .973 
Researcher Neutral 67 48 115   
 ATM-User 63 45 108   




The crosstabulation shows the interaction between the trials and accuracy of responses.  No 
differences are suggested.  The chi-square reports a non significant result of .45, suggesting that 
the results of the two trials are similar and can be combined. 
Coding 
Kelley (1973; Orvis, Cunningham, & Kelley, 1975) identified combinations of consensus, 
consistency and distinctiveness information that would result in attributions to persons, entities, 
and circumstances. These combinations (depicted in Table 3) are the predicted response to the 
‘So what went wrong?’ question based on the information provided in the different conditions. 
 
The information provided in condition one can be written out in a McArthur style format such as: 
Jon was successful at making a withdrawal from the ATMs. 
In the past, Jon has almost always been successful at withdrawing money from the same ATMs. 
Bob was not successful at the either ATM. 
 
Appling the rational of Kelley (1973) the predicted response to the question of “So what went 
wrong?” would be: Something to do with Bob 
 
The video vignettes in the study provided the same information by using four clips.  Below is a 
table of what the participants would have seen when they viewed the users attempting to make 
ATM withdrawals.  The first column indicates what the intended attribution was; the second 
column contains the information that was provided for use in making the attribution.  Finally, the 
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last column contains the predicted response according to Kelley (1967, 1973) based on the 
information that is provided. 
Table 12 




Information Provided Predicted Response 
Person: 
Bob 
Bob was unsuccessful at using the ATM on the right 
Jon was successful at using the ATM on the right 
Bob was unsuccessful at using the ATM on the left 
Jon was successful at using the ATM on the left 




Jon was unsuccessful at using the ATM on the right 
Bob was successful at using the ATM on the right 
Jon was unsuccessful at using the ATM on the left 
Bob was successful at using the ATM on the left 




Bob was unsuccessful at using the ATM on the right 
Jon was unsuccessful at using the ATM on the right 
Bob was successful at using the ATM on the left 
Jon was successful at using the ATM on the left 
Something to do 




Bob was successful at using the ATM on the right 
Jon was successful at using the ATM on the right 
Bob was unsuccessful at using the ATM on the left 
Jon was unsuccessful at using the ATM on the left 
Something to do 




The participant’s responses were coded according to their attributions, for example, if the 
response was “Something to do with Bob, Bob or the guy without the cap” the response would 
be coded as Something to do with Bob.  Next, the predicted response was listed, for example, 
when viewing the Person: Bob tape the expected response would be Something to do with Bob 
(or just Bob).  The actual response was compared to the predicted response and when they 
matched they were coded as ‘Correct’ and when they did not it was coded as incorrect.  Thus, the 
dependant variable is whether the participant selected the expected cause. 
 
The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to enter and analyse the data.  The 
literacy test scores were calculated to ensure that the respondents were competent.  All of the 
remaining 223 participants were eligible based on their scores.  Logistic regressions were used to 




The theoretical hypothesis was that participants would be likely to under-use or ignore consensus 
information in situations where attribution carried social risk, which was operationalised as the 
combination of the researcher in the ATM-user role and the provision of person information.  In 
other words, it was hypothesized that the social riskiness of the setting would have an effect on 
the ‘accuracy’ (as predicted by Kelley, 1967) of the answer provided by the participants for 
consensus but not for distinctiveness information.  The effect would be that the participant would 
be more likely to provide an incorrect answer under that condition.  If the hypothesis was true, 
then the results would reveal an interaction effect for the combination of the researcher as -
ATM-user role and person information when the dependant variable is the accuracy of the 
answer provided by the participant.  Additionally, it was hypothesised that the accuracy of the 
answer would not be affected in the other conditions.  It was expected that the majority of the 
answers would be correct due to the simplicity of the task and the adequate provision of the 
necessary information to the participants. 
 
 Binary logistic regression was chosen as the statistical technique to analyse the data because it 
was the most appropriate statistical technique for an experimental design, such as the current 
one, in which there is a categorical dependant variable and categorical independent variables 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998).  The primary reason for selecting the logistic 
regression is that it can be used to assess interaction effects in categorical data while 
differentiating between dependant and independent variables (in comparison to techniques that 
explore all relationships between variables without distinguishing between predictors and 




Binary logistic regression is also resistant to violations of assumptions since it does not assume 
linearity of relationship between the independent variables and the dependant, does not require 
normally distributed variables, and does not assume homoscedasticity.  Additionally, it includes 
straight-forward statistical tests with the impact of the predictor variables usually explained in 
terms of odds ratios.  Logistic regression applies maximum likelihood estimation after 
transforming the dependent into a logit variable (the natural log of the odds of the dependant 
occurring or not).  In this way, logistic regression estimates the odds of a variable contributing to 
an effect (Hair et.al., 1998). 
 
To run a binary logistic regression on this data in SPSS, the accuracy of the answer was entered 
as the dependant variable.  Next, the information type was entered with person information 
selected as the indicator (i.e. the results would indicate the effect that providing high person 
information has on the accuracy of the response) and the role of the researcher was included with 
the role of the ATM user selected as the indicator.  These independent variables were specified 
as being categorical.  The interaction of information type and role was included in the model 
since this would directly test the experimental hypothesis.  
 
The forward stepwise likelihood-ratio (LR) method was selected for the analysis because it 
generally avoids incorporating redundant variables in the model.  Forward selection starts with 
the constant only model and adds variables one at a time, starting with those that are most 
influential and stopping when none of the remaining variables would contribute significantly to 
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the model.  The LR option utilises the likelihood ratio test (chi-square difference) to assess 
significance. 
The following results were produced: 
Table 13 
Description of the data with accuracy of answer as the dependant variable 
 






Person (Consensus) 110 49.3 0 
Entity (Distinctiveness) 113 50.7 1 
Total 223 100.0  




Neutral Researcher 115 51.6 0 
ATM User 108 48.4 1 
Total 223 100  
Missing 0 0  
 
 
Accuracy of Answer 
  
  
Incorrect 45 20.2 0 
Correct 178 79.8 1 
Total 223 100.0  




Table 13 displays descriptive statistics for the sample by information type, researcher role and 
accuracy of answer.  It contains no missing data.  Person (high consensus) information was 
provided to 110 participants (49.3%) and 113 participants were provided with entity (high 
distinctiveness) information (50.7%).  The researcher interviewed 115 participants in the role of 
a neutral researcher (51.6%) and 108 in the role of an ATM user (48.4%).  Inaccurate responses 
were provided by 45 participants (20.2%) while 178 (79.8%) provided accurate responses, with 
accuracy judged according to Kelley’s (1967) model as discussed previously. 
 
Table 14 
 Distribution of data 
Researchers 
Role 
Information Type Accuracy 
of Answer 
Frequency Percentage 
Neutral Person (consensus) Incorrect 10 17.5% 
  Correct 47 82.5% 
 Entity (distinctiveness) Incorrect 8 13.8% 
  Correct 50 86.2% 
User Person (consensus) Incorrect 18 34.0% 
  Correct 35 66.0% 
 Entity (distinctiveness) Incorrect 9 16.4% 

































Distribution of data 
 
Figure 5 depicts the cross-tabulated distribution of the data.  The most visible variation is 
between the number of incorrect and correct responses.  The bars for the researcher role indicate 
more incorrect responses in the researcher-as-user group (bottom) than in the researcher-as-
researcher group (top).  There appear to be more incorrect responses in the consensus group than 
in the distinctiveness group.  The distribution of incorrect and correct answers across the 
conditions appear similar accept for the ATM user and person (high consensus) combination 
(third combination).  A higher number of incorrect responses were reported in this group (34%) 
when compared to the other groups (13.8%-17.5%).  
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Table 15  
Significance tests for logistic regression 
 
  Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 7.538 1 .006 
 Block 7.538 1 .006 
 Model 7.538 1 .006 
 
The omnibus tests for model coefficients were used to test for significance and results indicate 
that at least one of the predictors is significantly related to the response variable (χ2 = 7.538; p = 
.006). 
Table 16 
Measures of association 
 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 216.746 0.033 0.052 
 
The -2 Log likelihood (216.746) and pseudo-r2 estimates suggest that, although the model is 
significant, the relationship between variables is small.  Approximately 3.3% to 5.2% of the 
difference in answer correct is predicted by this pattern of association.  However, given that the 
overall percentage of incorrect answers was small (20.2%) and the hypothesis is related to this 




 Classification Table (a) 
 
   Predicted 




 Observed  Incorrect Correct 
Step 1 Accuracy of answer Incorrect 0 45 .0 
  Correct 0 178 100.0 
 Overall Percentage    79.8 
a The cut value is .500 
 
The classification table indicates that the predicted value for incorrect answers is 0 which is the 
same prediction made by Kelley (1967). The overall percentage correct is an indicator of 












Variables in the Equation 
 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% CI for 
Exp B) 




*ATM user  
1.002 .358 7.835 1 .005 2.724 1.350 5.494 
 Constant -1.667 .210 63.114 1 .000 .189   
a Variable(s) entered on step 1: Information type*researcher role, information type, researcher role 
  
The stepwise procedure stopped after step one and included only the interaction effect.  
Therefore the combination of researcher role (researcher-as-user vs. researcher-as-neutral) 
contributes significantly to the pattern of incorrect answers observed.  Specifically, interpreting 
these results in light of the indicator categories selected, the model suggests that the odds of 
receiving an incorrect answer from a participant in the experimental condition increases by 2.724 
(Exp(B); p = .005).  However, the confidence interval indicates that the odds could be as high as 
5.494 or as low as 1.055 
Table 19 
The excluded information types  
   Score df Sig. 
Step 1 Variables Person Info  .177 1 .674 
  ATM user .014 1 .905 






The final model  
Variable Model Log 
Likelihood 
Chang in - 
2 Log Likelihood 
df Sig. of the 
Change 
Step 1  Person *ATM user                 -112.142 7.538 1 .006 
 
Table 19 depicts the variables that were not included in the model.  The excluded variables 
indicate that, taken separately, neither person information nor the ATM user role account 
significantly for the observed variability in response.  However, the interaction between the two 
variables has a significant effect as discussed above (Table 20). 
 
The binary logistic regression was successful in identifying the interaction; however, the output 
does not allow us to isolate the source of variability in incorrect answers between the four 
possible combinations of person and entity information possible in the interaction effect.  This is 
due to the fact that the binary logistic model uses an individual case-level modeling approach.  In 
comparison, the multinomial logistic regression uses a subpopulation modeling approach and 
produces outputs based on these subpopulations that can isolate the source of influence more 
precisely SPSS (2007) argues that even when the predictor and response variables are 
categorical, the multinomial logistic regression can produce valid results.  This justified running 
a multinomial logistic regression model.  Given that the experimental hypothesis predicted that 
only the interaction effect will be significant and this was confirmed by the more appropriate 
















-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced 
Model 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 
 















a This reduced model is equivalent to the final model  
 
The interaction effect is significant in the multinomial logistic model (χ2 = 7.859; df. =3; p = 
































0.084 .504 0.028 .868 1.087 0.405 2.921 






-0.201 .527 0.146 .703 0.818 0.291 2.298 
 ATM User 0b       
a The reference category is: Correct 
b This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant 
 
The table of parameter estimates indicates that the only combination of information-type and 
researcher-role to achieve significance is the combination of person (consensus) information and 
researcher-as-ATM-user (p = .038).  The related odds ratio indicates that odds of receiving an 
incorrect answer from a participant in the high consensus and interviewed by the user condition 
increases by 2.629.  The confidence interval indicates that odds could increase by as much as 
6.550 or less as 1.055.  In comparison, the other conditions have smaller effect size and are not 
statistically significant.  These results correspond to those of the binary logistic model but isolate 
the source of variability of incorrect answers to the combination of person (consensus) 








The reviewed literature suggested that when individuals are provided with the different 
information types, as identified by Kelley (1967), consensus information was used comparatively 
less than distinctiveness or consistency information. Some studies suggested that it was ignored 
(McArthur, 1972, Nisbett & Borgida, 1975) while others suggested that it received a lesser 
treatment due to its poor operationalisation and methodology in the relevant studies (McArthur, 
1972; Pilkonis, 1977; Wells &Harvey, 1977).  Subsequent research that explored the issues that 
were raised (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; McArthur, 1976; Kassin, 1979; Wright et al., 1990) 
was unsuccessful in unraveling the problem.  However, although some studies obliquely 
suggested that the social nature of consensus information (compared to consistency and 
distinctiveness information) may potentially explain its anomalous treatment in terms of Kelley’s 
(1967) model, no previous studies have attempted to experimentally explore this hypothesis.  
This is somewhat surprising, since the attribution process is an everyday occurrence in society, it 
occurs in social contexts (and even laboratory settings are inescapably social) and the attributions 
often have social implications, for example, in the allocation of blame.  Furthermore, consensus 
information, which was empirically identified as being used to a lesser degree than expected in 
Kelley’s (1967) model, is particularly social compared to distinctiveness and consistency 
information.  
 
Based on the literature, it was hypothesised that the empirical under-use of consensus 
information may be related to the social context of attribution settings.  Individuals make 
attributions that have social implications; as a result, these implications influence the attribution 
that is made as individuals unconsciously or consciously disregard information and provide 
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socially acceptable responses to in response to the social features of the setting in which the 
attribution is made.  In contrast to early notions that people act as naïve psychologists or 
scientists (cf. Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967), it was hypothesised that attending to the social 
features of the attribution context may take be priority over veridical attribution.  
Design 
Previous studies (McArthur, 1972; Pilokonis, 1977 Wells & Harvey, 1977) identified possible 
flaws in operationalisation and methodology of attribution research.  As mentioned in the 
methodology chapter, this study was designed to avoid these potential flaws by using video 
vignettes instead of paper and pencil methods and by using a realistic social situation (ATM 
withdrawals).  Participants were required to make causal attributions on the failure to make an 
ATM withdrawal in either a neutral context or in a social context.  In these situations, they were 
provided with either person or entity information. The participant’s attributions were recorded 
and coded for accuracy as predicted by Kelley’s model. The results were analysed withlogistic 
regression. 
Discussion of Results 
Consistency information. 
Preliminary analysis indicated that the participants experienced difficulties in utilizing 
consistency information correctly.  The problem experienced by the participants with consistency 
information was most likely due to the difficulty in operationalising the information type in 
video vignettes.  While the distinctiveness and consensus variables were operationalised using 
non-abstract, tangible variables (left and right ATMs and two obviously different ATM users 
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respectively), consistency information was encoded by intangible abstract means, specifically: a 
written message at the bottom of the screen and a small digital clock readout at top-centre of the 
screen.  It may be argued that the consistency variables were more abstract and therefore more 
difficult to process, resulting in the information being ignored.  The variable was therefore 
dropped from the study.  This is problematic, as it allowed only a partial test of Kelley’s (1967) 
model.   
Treatment of distinctiveness information. 
Distinctiveness information was treated in the manner predicted by McArthur (1972) and other 
researchers (reviewed by Kelley & Michela, 1980; Harvey & Weary, 1984).  The participants 
used the information to make the predicted attributions when they were interviewed by both the 
ATM-user and the neutral-researcher.  There were no significant differences in the results with 
inaccurate responses provided only 13.8 percent of the time when interviewed by the researcher 
and 16.4 percent of the time when interviewed by the user. 
The reason for this treatment. 
These results provide a strong argument that distinctiveness information, since it is not socially 
risky, was treated in a predictable manner because there were no social implications of using or 
not using the information in producing an attribution.  The incorrect responses may be explained 
by one of two reasons, namely: the participants were not able to use the information correctly 
and/or got confused; or as suggested in the literature (Gerard, 1963; Misra, 1973, both in Kelley 
& Michela, 1980; Kelley, 1971) they substitute their own prior knowledge for the provided 
information and made attributions based on their past experiences, as indicated by responses 
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such as ‘he did not have sufficient funds’. This issue is elaborated on below, as a possible 
limitation.  
Treatment of Consensus Information 
The experimental hypothesis was confirmed as the results indicate that person information was 
treated in a different manner in the socially risky condition.  In the neutral condition, in which 
making an attribution that the fault lay with the actor, unconnected to the researcher, consensus 
information was treated in a similar manner to distinctiveness information. 
 
The consensus information was used as predicted by Kelley (1967) with an accuracy rate of 82 
percent when the interviewer was in the role of a neutral researcher, which is similar to the 
accuracy rates for distinctiveness conditions.  This suggests that consensus information is used as 
predicted by Kelley’s model when doing so does not risk upsetting the social fabric.  As with 
distinctiveness information, incorrect responses can be explained by the use of prior knowledge 
and because of error 
Treatment when interviewed by the user. 
In contrast to the accuracy rates reported above (85 percent and 82 percent), an accuracy rate of 
66 percent was reported when the participant was interviewed by researcher in the role of the 
ATM-user.  This supports the hypothesis that participants prioritise the social features of the 
attributional context over the expectation that they make veridically accurate attributions.  The 
analysis clearly indicates that this condition (person information with the researcher-as-ATM-
user) was the only condition that provided a comparatively high rate of inaccurate answers (34% 
percent).  Furthermore, logistic regression models estimate that a participant in the experimental 
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condition is 2.629 times more likely to provide an incorrect answer.  This condition was the only 
condition that significantly deviated from the norm and the only condition with a large effect size 
(as much as 6.550 or less as 1.055). 
 
The analysis revealed that there were none of the other conditions had any significantly impact 
on the accuracy of responses.  It also emerged that the person information and ATM role alone 
were not significant and it was only the interaction of these variables (the social context) that had 
an impact. This upholds the hypothesis that it is not consensus information itself that causes 
deviation from the predictions of Kelley’s (1967) model, but the combination of consensus 
information, which is social by nature, and the participant’s understanding of the social features 
of the attribution context that results in deviations from Kelley’s predictions. 
The Role of the Social Context on the Use of Consensus Information 
The results support the hypothesis that participants were more concerned with the social 
relationship in the experimental situation than the strict accuracy of their responses.  Instead of 
correctly attributing the failure to the ATM-user, the participants attributed it to a neutral or 
socially less risky factor such as the ATM.  It is not clear from this study whether participants 
knowingly distort their answers or whether the social context takes precedence over the 
attribution information at an unconscious level.  This would be an interesting avenue for future 
research. 
 
In terms of attribution research, this finding is useful in demonstrating that attribution accuracy is 
not always adhered too.  It also identifies that social situations are one of the susceptible areas 
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since consensus information or person information is vulnerable to social influences.  The 
reviewed literature highlighted the separate treatment of the different types of information as 
identified by McArthur (1972) and explored in later studies (Orvis et al. 1975; McArthur, 1976; 
Ruble & Feldman, 1976; Zuckerman, 1978).  Next, focusing on the work of McArthur (1972, 
1976); Kahneman and Tversky (1973); Nisbett and Borgida (1975); Pilkonis (1977) and Wells 
and Harvey (1977) the possible reason for this difference was fleshed out. The problematic 
nature of consensus information emerged as the key, and when its social nature and the work of 
Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) were considered the link to the social influence as a possible 
solution to the puzzle of the under-use of consensus information emerged.  
 
The results support McArthur’s (1972) suggestion that the nature of the variables may be 
responsible for the underuse of consensus information. This study manipulated the social nature 
of consensus information and found that social influence results in the different treatment of 
consensus information. Kahneman and Tversky (1973) and Nisbett and Borgida (1975) 
suggested that consensus information was disregarded or ignored. This study extends their 
findings, by suggesting that participants disregard consensus information when it is socially risky 
and may result in the embarrassment of other people.  Participants provide socially acceptable 
responses instead. 
 
Attribution research is broad and this study does not solve the mystery of the treatment of 
consensus information fully.  Instead it identifies the manner in which it may be treated in a 




Limitations and Future Considerations 
Budget. 
This experiment was a low budget Masters Thesis project.  A larger budget would have provided 
sufficient funds to counter many of the following limitations.  As a result there may be a few 
issues that remain inconclusive. 
The experimenter effect. 
The experimenter effect refers to the situation in which participants provide the answers that the 
experimenter wants in an attempt to please the experimenter.  Participants are able to pick up 
subtle cues that the experimenter unintentionally provides (in some instances intentionally and 
fraudulently provided).  Due to this phenomenon a large number social science studies that find 
significant results have to defend their results from claims that they were influenced by the 
experimenter effect and this study falls is no exception.  However, in the present study the 
experimental manipulation is more obviously about the experimenter than those in which the 
experimenter simply reads from a different script to affect the manipulations. In this case the 
experimenter changes clothes and uses a different name with full knowledge of the experimental 
condition into which participants have been selected.  As a result, there is a possibility that the 
findings of this study may be fully or partially explained by this effect.  However, the risk of the 
experimenter effect is no greater with the present methodology than with any other experiment 
that fails to implement double-blinding, which includes the vast majority of studies in social 
psychology.  For future research it would be worth repeating the study using blinding techniques 
such that the researcher is not aware of the expected outcomes of the experiment.  However, 
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blinding would have required hiring and training a research assistant which was not possible on a 
low budget masters project.  
Problems with the design. 
On a positive note, the use of video vignettes proved successful.  However, problems with 
visually encoding consistency information meant that the current study could not fully test 
Kelley’s model.  As a limitation, the study should have included a post-experiment interview to 
confirm the reasons for participants providing inaccurate responses and an independent 
manipulation check to determine the extent to which participants ‘read’ the threatening social 
situation in the experimental condition.  
Prior knowledge. 
Kelley (1971) and McArthur (1972) both noted that participants have an additional knowledge 
source, namely prior knowledge, when making attributions.  This was clearly demonstrated in 
this project and it is thought to be responsible for a few incorrect responses.  The attempt at a 
withdrawal of money from an ATM scenario was chosen because it was thought that participants 
would be familiar with the process, and because the scenario would allow for the information to 
be manipulated easily and because it provided a naturalistic setting.  However, it is possible that 
familiarity with the situation and the use of prior knowledge may have decreased the effect size 




This study explored the hypothesis that it is the social nature of consensus information that 
results in its anomalous use in terms of Kelley’s (1967) model of attribution.  More specifically, 
it hypothesised that it is when consensus information interacts with social features of the 
experimental context, such as the social risk or safety, that it is not used as predicted by Kelley’s 
model.  In addition, the study attempted to incorporate the lessons learned from its predecessors 
by changing the design, and adopting the use of video vignettes and dropping the paper and 
pencil methodology, creating a realistic social setting as opposed to the use of hypothetical 
statements and paper-and-pencil measures.  
 
The results of this study support the hypothesis that consensus information is treated differently 
by participants in threatening or neutral social settings, as participants were 2.63 times more 
likely to provide ‘inaccurate’ responses when they were provided with consensus information in 
a socially risky situation. This finding is a step for attribution theorists in the direction of 
unraveling one of the oldest and sometimes forgotten puzzles that of the underuse and incorrect 
use of consensus information. Prior research as discussed earlier has attempted to provide 
reasons for the lesser use of consensus information but no prior explanation has proved to be 
acceptable.  
 
The results suggest that participants in social contexts prioritise the social demands of the context 
over strict accuracy in terms of Kelley’s (1967) model.  It can therefore be deduced that the 
attribution process is more social than Kelley (1967) realised or accounted for.  This factor was 
not adequately considered when the model was conceptualised and as a result it has emerged as a 
100 
 
weak link in the theory. Kelley (1967) hypothesised that individual’s act as scientists when 
forming attributions; however, it appears that under social influence they act as disobedient 
psychologists and are more concerned with avoiding socially risk situations than with 
maintaining scientific validity.  
 
The study has served the function of setting up a platform for future research to unravel the 
anomalous treatment of consensus information.  It has demonstrated the effective use of video 
vignettes for this purpose and the findings are significant to warrant further research in this area. 
Future research, which considers the limitations and lessons learned from this study, should be 
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